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The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the
“Law of the Poor”
ANNE FLEMING*
What happened to unconscionability? Here’s one version of the story: The
doctrine of unconscionability experienced a brief resurgence in the mid-1960s
at the hands of naive, left-liberal, activist judges, who used it to rewrite private
consumer contracts according to their own sense of justice. These folks meant
well, no doubt, much like present-day consumer protection crusaders who seek
to ensure the “fairness” of financial products and services. But courts’ refusal
to enforce terms they deemed “unconscionable” served only to increase the cost
of doing business with low-income households. Judges ended up hurting the
very people they were trying to help. In the face of incisive criticism, judicial
enthusiasm for the doctrine of unconscionability quickly faded. A new consen-
sus emerged in favor of legislation requiring better disclosure of consumer
contract terms ex ante, rather than ex post judicial review.
This Article presents a different narrative, one that is informed by extensive
research in previously untapped archival sources. In this story, the wise legisla-
ture does not overrule the misguided courts. On the contrary, it reveals that
lawmakers laid the groundwork for the judicial revival of unconscionability,
and then rewrote statutory rules to codify the ensuing court decisions. In the
District of Columbia, home to the famous Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co. litigation, the legislature revived unconscionability through the enactment
of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which reintroduced the once-
archaic doctrine into the legal vernacular. Just as the U.C.C. drafters intended,
unconscionability review allowed courts to do openly what they had been doing
covertly for years—refuse to enforce harsh, one-sided bargains as written. In
1965, the D.C. Circuit seized the opportunity unconscionability offered to
prevent the loss of a poor woman’s furniture. But the Williams litigation also
did something more. It drew public attention to the controversy before the court
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and alerted D.C. lawmakers to a recurring problem in need of a legislative fix.
In response, local leaders set to work drafting consumer credit reform legisla-
tion. Lawmakers eventually adopted a firm set of rules to govern “installment”
sales contracts in the District of Columbia, including a ban on the objection-
able contract term at issue in Williams.
In this narrative, judges and legislators did not advance competing regula-
tory visions. They agreed on the need for substantive limits on installment sales
to poor borrowers. Moreover, contrary to what some scholars might predict,
litigation did not divert scarce resources down a dead-end path. Rather, it
catalyzed the process of legislative change, raising public consciousness of
problems in the low-income marketplace and fueling the drive for substantive
reforms on the local level.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 1967, Judge Skelly Wright was hopeful about the future of unconscio-
nability.1 President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty was well underway,
and battalions of lawyers had been deployed across the country to provide free
legal assistance to low-income Americans. Wright predicted that the doctrine of
unconscionability would prove “very helpful” in their work.2 Two years earlier,
he had authored the majority opinion in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., one of the first decisions in the country on unconscionability.3 The opinion
declared that courts in the District of Columbia could refuse to enforce a sales
contract if the bargain was “unconscionable”—meaning that there was “an
absence of meaningful choice” for one party along with “terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.”4 Williams, a single mother of seven
on public assistance, had bought some household goods on credit from a local
furniture store.5 When she defaulted, after paying off most of the debt, the store
claimed the right to repossess everything Williams had purchased during the
previous five years.6 Wright found that the store’s contract was potentially
“unconscionable” and therefore unenforceable.7
Wright described the Williams decision, and unconscionability more gener-
ally, as part of a “growing area of the law—the law of the poor.”8 His use of this
phrase in 1967—the “law of the poor”—was no doubt deliberate. Two years
before, legal scholar and disability rights advocate Jacobus tenBroek had de-
fined the “law of the poor” as “a body of laws governing the poor, regarded as a
distinct class in society.”9 The rules that governed and defined the “legal status”
of the poor were not of “general application,” tenBroek observed.10 The field
cut cross across a range of substantive areas, including landlord–tenant, family,
and social welfare law.11 Wright understood Williams in tenBroek’s terms, as
1. Letter from Hon. J. Skelly Wright to William E. Shipley, The Lawyers Cooperative Publ’n Co.
(July 12, 1967) (J. Skelly Wright Papers, 1962–1987, Box 77, Folder 1965 September term, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress). The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company is now part of Thomp-
son West. Williams was included in the American Law Reports entry on “‘Unconscionability’ as ground
for refusing enforcement of contract for sale of goods or agreement collateral thereto.” Letter from
William E. Shipley, The Lawyers Cooperative Publ’n Co., to Hon. J. Skelly Wright (July 7, 1967)
(J. Skelly Wright Papers, 1962–1987, Box 77, Folder 1965 September term, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress). The entry first appeared in 1968. See V. Woerner, Annotation, “Unconscionabil-
ity” as Grounds for Refusing Enforcement of Contract for Sale of Goods or Agreement Collateral
Thereto, 18 A.L.R.3d 1305 (1968).
2. Letter from Hon. J. Skelly Wright to William E. Shipley, supra note 1.
3. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
4. Id. at 449.
5. Id. at 448.
6. Id. at 447.
7. Id. at 450.
8. Letter from Hon. J. Skelly Wright to William E. Shipley, supra note 1.
9. Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present
Status, Part III, 17 STAN. L. REV. 614, 614 (1965).
10. Id.
11. Michael E. Tigar, Symposium: Introduction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 322, 323–24 (1966).
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part of a body of decisions that defined the relationship between poor families
and the government officials, landlords, and merchants who served them.12 He
hoped that Williams marked a turning point in the “law of the poor,” offering
litigants a way around the old rules that had “cooperated” in creating and
perpetuating “the injustice involved in the way many of the poor were required
to live in the nation’s capital.”13
At first blush, it would seem that the case fell far short of Wright’s expecta-
tions. By the dawn of the twenty-first century, unconscionability had lost much
of its initial promise as a tool for protecting poor consumers. Looking back, it is
clear that the doctrine reached the height of its influence within the decade
following Williams.14 Today, it is rarely invoked to protect low-income borrow-
ers.15 Lawyers most often raise the defense to invalidate arbitration provisions
in consumer contracts, as in the recent Supreme Court case of AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion.16
12. See J. Skelly Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for Law, 1970 DUKE L.J. 425, 426–30
(describing the poor’s relationship with the law, focusing on the small claims courts, police courts, and
landlord–tenant courts where “the poor get short shrift”).
13. In a 1982 letter, Wright explained that he thought law could be used as a tool to combat
injustices against the poor. Letter from Hon. J. Skelly Wright to Professor Edward H. Rabin, Univ. of
Cal., Davis Sch. of Law (Oct. 14, 1982), in Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential
Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 549 (1984). Of his
decisions in landlord–tenant cases, he wrote:
I didn’t like what I saw, and I did what I could to ameliorate, if not eliminate, the injustice
involved in the way many of the poor were required to live in the nation’s capital.
I offer no apology for not following more closely the legal precedents which had cooperated
in creating the conditions that I found unjust.
Id. Wright also understood that poverty was disproportionately concentrated among urban minorities.
Wright, supra note 12, at 426; J. Skelly Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 26 (noting that “particularly in the inner city, a vastly disproportionate number
of the poor are Negroes”).
14. See Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory
Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 39 (2005) (noting that “courts have historically been extremely reluctant to
label loans unconscionable” and that today “unconscionability standards provide more of a facade of
fairness, rather than an effective instrument of consumer protection”).
15. But see State ex rel. King v. Fastbucks Holding Corp., No. D0101-CV-2009-01917, slip op. at
5–6 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Sept. 26, 2012), available at http://www.creditslips.org/files/fastbucks-decision-
1.pdf (finding payday lender’s practices “unconscionable” and requiring payment of restitution).
16. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Unconscionability has become a favored defense against arbitration
because it is one of the few state law defenses not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. See
Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the
California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 48 (2006)
(reviewing all unconscionability cases decided by the California Courts of Appeal from August 27,
1982, to January 26, 2006, and finding 114 cases challenging arbitration agreements (with 53% success
rate) and 46 cases challenging ordinary contracts (with 11% success rate)); Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce
Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1097 (2006) (analyzing a sample of 148 reported federal court decisions from
1968–1980 and 1991–2003 and finding that only 30% of cases involved a sale of goods); Susan
Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L.
REV. 185, 194 (2004) (finding that 68.5% of all unconscionability cases from 2002–2003—235
total—challenged arbitration agreements rather than ordinary contracts and that arbitration cases had a
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Williams has had far greater influence and staying power in the classroom
than in the courtroom. It remains a darling of contracts scholars and a staple of
the first-year law school curriculum. The vast majority of contracts casebooks
include the opinion.17 Few would dispute that Williams is “still the most famous
unconscionability case of all.”18 At last count, over seven hundred law review
articles cited the decision.19 Many use the Williams fact pattern to raise norma-
tive questions about what the law should be or apply the methods of law and
economics to weigh the costs of the ruling as a matter of public policy.20 Others
cite the case as a shared point of reference, a starting point for spinning out a
hypothetical scenario that bears little resemblance to the underlying dispute.21 A
few raise pedagogical questions about how to teach the case without reinforcing
“raced tropes linking poverty, lack of education, single parenthood, and lack of
capacity with black women.”22 In short, Williams has proved a far more
“helpful” precedent—to use Wright’s words—for legal academics than for
poverty lawyers.
What happened? Here’s one version of the story: The doctrine of unconsciona-
bility experienced a brief resurgence in the mid-1960s at the hands of naive,
left-liberal, activist judges, who used it to rewrite private consumer contracts
according to their own sense of justice. These folks meant well, no doubt, much
like present-day consumer protection crusaders who seek to ensure the “fair-
ness” of financial products and services. But courts’ refusal to enforce terms
they deemed “unconscionable” served only to increase the cost of doing busi-
ness with low-income households. Judges ended up hurting the very people they
were trying to help. In the face of incisive criticism, judicial enthusiasm for the
higher success rate—50.3% compared to 25.6%); Paul Thomas, Conscionable Judging: A Case Study
of California Courts’ Grapple with Challenges to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
1065, 1083 tbl.1 (2011) (finding that the vast majority of unconscionability cases decided between 2005
and 2008 by the California Courts of Appeal—89 out of 119—challenged arbitration agreements).
17. One recent survey of twenty contracts casebooks found that the Williams decision appears in
all but two. Russell Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-Economics Analysis of
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441, 441, 442 n.12 (2004).
Another survey from 1994 found the case in almost all casebooks. Muriel Morisey Spence, Teaching
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 89, 90 & n.5 (1994).
18. 1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 659 (3d ed. 2010).
19. A Westlaw KeyCite search performed on August 7, 2012, for all law review articles citing
Williams returned 743 results. A LEXIS search on the same date found 643 articles.
20. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 304–07 (5th ed. 2008); Oren Bar-Gill
& Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 717, 738–40 (2005) (using the Williams
fact pattern to illustrate how to apply “credibility analysis”); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic,
98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1431–33 (2004) (using the Williams fact pattern to show the application of the
author’s “underestimation theory”); Korobkin, supra note 17, at 441 (not analyzing Wright’s decision in
Williams, but rather considering whether the lower court on remand should have found the Williams
contract at issue unconscionable, applying both “traditional” and “behavioral” economic analysis).
21. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of Consumer
Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 681–82 (2012) (suggesting that if the Williams transaction were
replicated today, the borrower might have comparison shopped with an iPhone).
22. Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some
Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 306 (1994); Spence, supra note 17, at 95.
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doctrine of unconscionability quickly faded. A new consensus emerged in favor
of legislation requiring better disclosure of contract terms ex ante, rather than ex
post judicial review.23
This Article presents a different narrative, one that is informed by extensive
research in previously untapped archival sources.24 In this story, the wise
legislature does not overrule the misguided courts. On the contrary, it reveals
that lawmakers laid the groundwork for the judicial revival of unconscionability
and then rewrote statutory rules to codify the results of the ensuing litigation.
Judges and legislators did not advance competing regulatory visions. They
agreed on the need for substantive limits on installment sales to poor borrowers.
Moreover, contrary to what some scholars might predict, litigation did not
divert scarce resources down a dead-end path.25 Rather, it catalyzed a process of
legislative change, raising public consciousness of problems in the low-income
23. This account is drawn from: Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18
J.L. & ECON. 293, 307, 315 (1975) (arguing that add-on clauses “make good sense in the cases to which
they apply” and that substantive unconscionability review “serves only to undercut the private right of
contract in a manner that is apt to do more social harm than good”); Stewart Macaulay, Bambi Meets
Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 575, 580 (1989) (“Casebook notes and
questions, and a few articles suggest that Williams now plays a very different role in the drama of this
era. Writers see the case as an expression of knee-jerk liberalism.” (footnote omitted)); Christopher L.
Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth
in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 875–80 (2003) (describing federal preemption of state substantive
lending regulation and the creation of a federal disclosure-based regime in the 1960s and 1970s); Dee
Pridgen, Putting Some Teeth in TILA: From Disclosure to Substantive Regulation in the Mortgage
Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2010, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 615, 619 (2012) (describ-
ing disclosure as “a preferred approach to problems in consumer credit”); David L. Shapiro, Courts,
Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 535–36 (1988) (noting that the “landmark decisions
declining enforcement of written provisions,” such as Williams, “are beginning to stand out in the
casebooks as curiosities”); Eben Colby, Comment, What Did the Doctrine of Unconscionability Do to
the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 625, 657–58 (2002) (arguing that “truth-in-
lending” legislation had a greater influence than unconscionability on lenders to the poor).
24. Out of the many law review articles about Williams, only one comment explores the history of
the case. It examines the effect of the Williams decision on Walker-Thomas Furniture’s subsequent
business practices. See Colby, supra note 23, at 646–60. Colby concludes that Williams had little impact
on Walker-Thomas Furniture’s lending practices, based on published decisions, articles, and a 2001
telephone interview with an unidentified “attorney who has represented the Walker-Thomas Furniture
Company.” Id. at 649 n.183, 660. Some contracts casebooks also present the Williams opinion in
historical context, alongside excerpts from 1960s and 1970s law review articles on unconscionability or
empirical studies of lending. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS 497–503 (7th ed. 2008);
1 MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 18, at 658–718.
25. On the choice between markets, litigation, and legislation in dealing with “boilerplate” contract
terms, see, e.g., William C. Whitford, Contract Law and the Control of Standardised Terms in
Consumer Contracts: An American Report, 3 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 193, 194 (1995). For skepticism that
litigation can lead to social change, see, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 3 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come
Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 151 (1974) (“We have
surmised that court-produced substantive rule-change is unlikely in itself to be a determinative element
in producing tangible redistribution of benefits.”).
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marketplace and fueling the drive for substantive reforms on the local level.26
This Article argues that Williams captures a moment of transition in the law
of the poor, but the arc of the narrative does not follow the trajectory Wright
envisioned. Williams did not launch a poor people’s consumer rights move-
ment.27 There was no Williams analog to the tenants’ rights revolution sparked
by Wright’s decision in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., which recognized
an implied warranty of habitability.28 Instead, the Williams litigation served a
different function. It triggered the enactment of statutory reforms.29 Within a
decade of the Williams decision, Congress passed a new set of bright-line rules
to govern transactions between poor consumers in the District of Columbia and
merchants like Walker-Thomas Furniture.
The case came before the court at a critical juncture, when the simmering
discontent of poor consumers was about to boil over in the urban riots of the
mid-1960s. In response to this rising pressure from below, the decision opened
a temporary “safety valve.”30 It prevented an undesirable result in the case
before the court, while at the same time alerting D.C. lawmakers to a recurring
problem in need of a legislative fix. D.C. leaders got the message. They set
to work drafting consumer credit reform legislation. References to Williams
and “the Ora Lee Williams situation” recur throughout the ensuing congres-
sional debates.31 Lawmakers eventually settled on a firm set of rules to govern
“installment” sales contracts.32 They explicitly banned the contract term that
26. Other scholars have also observed the salience-raising effect of high-profile court cases. See,
e.g., Patrick J. Egan et al., Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 234, 256
(Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that gay-marriage litigation raised the salience of the issue
and created a short-term backlash against gay rights); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and
Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 453 (2005) (arguing that Brown “dramatically raised the salience of
the segregation issue”).
27. David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warrant of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 389,
391 n.3 (2011) (“The difficulties that aborted the nascent low-income consumers’ revolution [after
Williams] parallel closely those of the tenants’ rights revolution . . . .”).
28. 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For a detailed history of the Javins litigation, see
Richard H. Chused, Saunders (a.k.a. Javins) v. First National Realty Corporation, 11 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 191 (2004).
29. This is not to suggest that Javins had no impact on statutory law. Two years after Javins, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act, later adopted in many states. Anthony J. Fejfar, Permissive Waste and the
Warranty of Habitability in Residential Tenancies, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 12 (2000). The Uniform Act
attempts to define what a landlord must do to maintain a habitable dwelling. Id. at 14 (observing that
“the Act arguably provides a more stringent standard than the common law implied warranty of
habitability”). I thank Joseph Singer for alerting me to this parallel.
30. Contracts scholar Charles Knapp has theorized that unconscionability acts as a “safety valve.”
Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability as a Signaling
Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 609 (2009).
31. See, e.g., Consumer Protection Legislation for the District of Columbia: Hearings on S. 316,
S. 2589, S. 2590, and S. 2592 Before the Subcomm. on Bus. & Commerce of the S. Comm. on the Dist.
of Columbia, 90th Cong. 119 (1968) (statement of Stephen M. Nassau, representing the Consumer
Protection Committee of the Greater Washington Chapter of Americans for Democratic Action).
32. See District of Columbia Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-200, sec. 4, 85
Stat. 665, 670 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 28-3805 (2012)).
2014] 1389THE RISE AND FALL OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
gave rise to the “situation in the Williams case,” to ensure that a future
Mrs. Williams would not need to rely on unconscionability alone for protection.33
Charting the rise and fall of unconscionability as the “law of the poor,” this
Article situates the Williams opinion as the pivot point in a five-part narrative.
Part I sets the stage for the Williams litigation. It shows how legal developments
intersected with political, social, and economic change in the postwar period to
create the two-tiered consumer credit market in which Ora Lee Williams
borrowed. It describes how Williams came to do business with Walker-Thomas
Furniture, her contracts and ongoing relationship with the store, and the re-
possession of her purchases. Although Judge Wright would later characterize
Williams’s bargain as particularly harsh, the terms and tactics that Walker-
Thomas Furniture employed in her case were quite common.
Part II explains how D.C. courts adjudicated disputes over poor people’s
contracts before Williams and the rise of unconscionability. As historian Allen
Kamp has shown, unconscionability was an “obscure” doctrine in American
contract law before World War II, “noted only in footnotes or marginal sections
of legal texts.”34 It originated in seventeenth-century English Court of Chancery
decisions involving the disposition of family property.35 Unconscionability was
reborn in the 1940s, when it appeared in early drafts of the new Uniform
Commercial Code article on sales.36 Before the District of Columbia adopted
the Code in 1963, unconscionability was not recognized as a valid defense in
contract disputes.37 Instead, D.C. lawyers and judges employed other, round-
about methods to justify decisions not to enforce harsh, one-sided bargains as
written. They might stretch the limits of traditional defenses, or else interpret
contract terms in bizarre ways.38
Part III reconstructs the full history of the Williams litigation. Drawing on
archival research from a variety of sources, this research reveals that the case
took a surprising and quite fortuitous turn at the eleventh hour of the litigation,
when Williams’s appeal reached the D.C. Circuit. Although Williams is now
famous as a case about unconscionability, the parties almost failed to brief the
defense. Williams did not raise unconscionability at trial or during her initial
appeal. It arose for the first time when Williams petitioned for review to the
D.C. Circuit.39 In response, the court issued an unusual order, granting review
and appointing a local lawyer as amicus curiae. The amicus brief ended up
focusing almost entirely on unconscionability. As a result of this unlikely chain
33. Benny L. Kass, Letter to the Editor, More Than Case Law Needed, 55 A.B.A. J. 289, 316 (1969).
34. Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940–49, 51 SMU
L. REV. 275, 312 (1998).
35. Id. at 310.
36. See infra section II.B.
37. See Act of Dec. 30, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-243, § 28:2-302, 77 Stat. 630, 645 (enacting the
Uniform Commercial Code for the District of Columbia). The Code took effect on January 1, 1965.
38. See infra section II.C.
39. See infra section III.B.
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of events, unconscionability became the major issue in Williams. Indeed, Judge
Wright relied solely on the doctrine to justify the court’s decision to reverse the
judgment below for Walker-Thomas Furniture and remand the case to the trial
court.
Yet, Wright’s final published decision contains only traces of his original
thinking. As early drafts of the opinion reflect, Wright was particularly worried
by Walker-Thomas Furniture’s methods of doing business with poor bor-
rowers. Repossession of used merchandise seemed to be part of the Walker-
Thomas Furniture business model, rather than an unintended consequence of
selling goods on credit to low-income buyers. Wright suspected that the com-
pany made a practice of selling unaffordable, high-priced items to its customers
when their debts were nearly paid off, with the knowledge that they would
likely default. The company could then repossess and resell the items to the
next buyer. However, Wright decided not to raise these concerns in the opinion.
Instead, after consulting with his colleagues, he shifted the focus of the de-
cision away from the company’s pattern and practice of dealing to highlight
the unique problems in the transactions before the court.40 The final opinion
portrayed Walker-Thomas Furniture’s actions in the two cases as unusually
exploitative and the defendants as particularly vulnerable, while understating
the novelty of the legal holding.
Part IV describes the wave of federal and local consumer credit regulation
that Congress enacted in the wake of Williams and the urban uprisings of the
mid-1960s. Here, the real impact of Williams is apparent. The Williams litiga-
tion drew attention to abuses in the low-income marketplace and helped bring
about the passage of retail installment sales legislation in the District of
Columbia. Reformers agreed that judicial policing through the doctrine of
unconscionability did not offer a permanent solution to the “Williams situation.”
They sought to preserve unconscionability as a defense for poor borrowers but
also pushed for statutory protections that would create bright-line boundaries
for installment sellers and buyers, including an outright ban on the “pro rata”
allocation of customer payments. They hoped that these rights and regulations
would inject some measure of equality and fairness into the consumer contract-
ing process. Thus, in the end, Williams played a role in creating a “law of the
poor” consumer in the District of Columbia, but not the role that Wright had
envisioned.
Part V investigates what happened to Williams and Walker-Thomas Furniture
after the D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the trial court. Walker-Thomas
Furniture eventually went out of business, but modern rent-to-own stores serve
a similar clientele. These stores offer a slightly different product, however. They
“lease” household goods, rather than selling on the installment plan. As a result,
40. See Memorandum from Hon. David L. Bazelon to Hon. J. Skelly Wright (July 15, 1965)
(J. Skelly Wright Papers, 1962–1987, Box 77, Folder 1965 September term, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress).
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rent-to-own transactions generally do not fall within the scope of installment
sales regulations. Indeed, in the District of Columbia, rent-to-own stores operate
beyond the bounds of the retail installment sales legislation enacted in the wake
of Williams. Part V concludes with a reflection on the fate of “the law of
the poor,” as a conceptual category, and the reasons for its decline in the late
twentieth century.
I. BUYING ON CREDIT IN “THE OTHER AMERICA”
Ora Lee Williams’s case against Walker-Thomas Furniture ended differently
than most, but it began in a familiar way. Williams followed a well-worn path
out of the South to the urban North, settling in the Northeast section of the
District of Columbia by the late 1950s. Educated in southern schools, she
completed the eighth grade but did not attend high school. She had married and
separated by the time her case against Walker-Thomas Furniture came to trial in
1963.41 Between 1957 and 1962, Williams supported herself and her seven
children on no more than $218 per month in public assistance. The family lived
in the 5500 block of Foote Street in the Northeast quadrant of the District of
Columbia. Williams’s neighbors were almost all African-American and over a
quarter also lived in poverty.42
Walker-Thomas Furniture employed a team of door-to-door salesmen who
came to Williams’s neighborhood hawking their wares, part of the “peddler
economy” serving low-income consumers in cities across the nation. Agents
traveled door-to-door offering a range of household goods on credit.43 The
furniture store’s salesmen doubled as collection agents, picking up monthly or
biweekly payments while soliciting new sales.44 Williams signed sixteen sepa-
41. Transcript of Record at 44–45, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C.
1964) (No. 3389). At trial, Williams testified that she had reached the eighth grade. In a later article
about the case, her lawyer explained that Williams “had a sixth grade education in a southern school
and was just barely literate.” Pierre E. Dostert, Case Studies in Consumer Fraud, 25 BUS. LAW. 153, 153
(1969).
42. In the late 1950s, Williams received $179 per month; by the time her case came to trial, she had
begun working and her relief payments had been reduced to $129 per month. Transcript of Record at
45, 54, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3389). At the time of
her last purchase, she received $218 per month in relief. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. 1964). In 1960, Williams’s census tract was 99.8% African-American and
25% of families earned less than $3,000 per year. Data for D.C. Census Tract 786 (1960), SOCIAL
EXPLORER, http://www.socialexplorer.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). In this period, before the release
of official federal poverty guidelines, President Johnson’s Council of Economic Advisors set the
poverty line at $3,000 in 1962 dollars for all families, regardless of size. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS,
1964 ANNUAL REPORT 58, available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/erp/issue/1208/download/
5639/ERP_ARCEA_1964.pdf. Williams’s race does not appear in the court record, but another scholar
confirms that Williams was African-American. Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity
in Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889, 926 n.208 (1997).
43. Consumer Credit Labeling Bill: Hearings on S. 2755 Before the Subcomm. on Prod. &
Stabilization of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 86th Cong. 101 (1960) (statement of William
Kirk, Union Settlement Association).
44. David I. Greenberg, Easy Terms, Hard Times: Complaint Handling in the Ghetto, in NO ACCESS
TO LAW: ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM 379, 381–82 (Laura Nader ed., 1980).
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rate contracts with Walker-Thomas Furniture, nearly all in response to a sales-
man’s home visit. She traveled to the company’s store only once to make a
purchase.45 The Walker-Thomas Furniture store was located almost six miles
from Williams’s apartment, at 1031 Seventh Street in Northwest Washington.
Merchants serving low-income consumers clustered in a row on Seventh Street,
known as an “easy credit” corridor.46 The Walker-Thomas Furniture store had
occupied the same three-story retail space on Seventh Street since 1938, when it
moved from its prior location down the block.47 The storefront was easily
recognizable from a distance. A two-story-tall neon sign placed in the center of
the yellow brick building advertised the store’s name in vertically arranged
characters spelling out “Walker-Thomas.”48 From 1940 onwards, the neighbor-
hood around the store was predominantly African-American. By 1960, over
ninety percent of the residents were black and over forty percent of families
lived in poverty.49
Like other major American cities, the District of Columbia underwent signifi-
Information concerning Walker-Thomas Furniture’s sales and collection practices is drawn in part from
Greenberg’s 1975 field research on the furniture store. The practices he observed are in keeping with
those described in the Williams records.
45. Transcript of Record at 47, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964)
(No. 3389).
46. SENATOR WARREN G. MAGNUSON & JEAN CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE: THE PLIGHT
OF THE AMERICAN CONSUMER 36–38 (1968); see also Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(affirming FTC order against merchant for bait-and-switch advertising and failure to disclose credit
terms, issued against jewelry retailer in Seventh Street corridor that sold 85% of its goods on credit).
47. In the early twentieth century, William G. Thomas and William T. Walker owned the business,
which was then called the W.T. Walker Furniture Company. The store was located at 1510 Seventh
Street. BOYD’S DIRECTORY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 1216 (1908). It later moved to 1013–1015
Seventh Street. Nat’l Parks Serv., National Register of Historic Places—Nomination Form, East Side of
the 1000 Block of Seventh Street, N.W., Record No. 84000861, at 14 (1984), available at http://
pdfhost.focus.nps.gov/docs/NRHP/Text/84000861.pdf. Court and newspaper records describe only three
of the debt collection cases filed by the store in the early twentieth century. All three involved black
customers who bought furniture on credit. See, e.g., W.T. Walker Furniture Co. v. Dyson, 32 App. D.C.
90, 91 (1908) (debtor William H. Dyson); Charged with Violating Contract, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1905,
at 3 (reporting that “a negro” was “arraigned in Police Court yesterday charged with concealing
personal property held under an uncompleted contract of sale” with W.T. Walker Furniture Co.); Jailed
for Contract Debt, WASH. POST, July 17, 1908, at 9 (reporting that “colored” defendant was sentenced to
jail after being unable to pay a fine for defaulting on a contract with W.T. Walker Furniture Co.).
Census records identify two men named William H. Dyson living in the District of Columbia in 1900.
Both were black. 1900 U.S. Federal Census (Population Schedule), District of Columbia, ED 140,
Sheet 2S, Dwelling 429, Family 513, Dyson household, ANCESTRY.COM, http://www.ancestry.com (last
visited Nov. 2013); 1900 U.S. Federal Census (Population Schedule), District of Columbia, ED 131,
Sheet 4, Dwelling 68, Family 72, Dyson household, ANCESTRY.COM, http://www.ancestry.com (last
visited Nov. 2013). I thank Victor Goldberg for drawing my attention to the Dyson case.
48. Nat’l Parks Serv., National Register of Historic Places—Nomination Form, East Side of the
1000 Block of Seventh Street, N.W., Record No. 84000861, at 8 (1984), available at http://pdfhost.
focus.nps.gov/docs/NRHP/Text/84000861.pdf.
49. Walker-Thomas Furniture sits on the border of two census tracts. In 1940, the tracts were 69%
and 96.7% African-American; 83.7% and 98.2% in 1950; 94.4% and 99.5% in 1960; and 92.4% and
99.8% in 1970. Families earning less than $3,000 per year made up 40.7% of one tract and 45.9% of
the adjacent tract. Data for District Census Tracts 48 and 49 (1940–1970), SOCIAL EXPLORER, http://
www.socialexplorer.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
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cant demographic changes in the postwar period. By 1957, it was the first major
city in the nation with a majority black population.50 Between 1940 and 1960,
the population of the city overall grew by fifteen percent, but the black
population more than doubled. In the same period, the white population fell by
over a quarter.51 Wealth clustered in particular quarters of the city, while others
were marked by high rates of poverty. In 1959, the median family income in the
District of Columbia was $6,000.52 But fifteen census tracts in the upper
northwest had median incomes over $10,000, while sixteen tracts had median
incomes under $4,000.53 Poverty was disproportionately concentrated among
the city’s black population. The overall poverty rate in the District of Columbia
was ten percent—approximately half of the national average—yet nearly one in
four nonwhite families lived in poverty.54 Black and white, rich and poor lived
and shopped in different places and spaces. One study of urban unrest in this
period concluded that “[o]ur Nation is moving toward two societies, one black,
one white—separate and unequal.”55 Nowhere was this more apparent than in
the nation’s capital.
Williams shopped and borrowed in a consumer landscape strikingly different
from that of her white, middle-class, suburban counterparts. Poor consumers
continued to finance new purchases through installment credit, which required
regular payments at scheduled intervals. In contrast, many retailers to the
middle-class offered their customers “revolving” credit, loans for goods pur-
chased that were repayable in irregular amounts over time with no set payment
schedule or end date. Revolving borrowers paid interest on their outstanding
debt but had greater flexibility in deciding when and how much to pay each
month, and their purchases were not subject to repossession by the seller. Some
retailers to the middle-class did offer installment credit, but most of these stores
were able to sell their customers’ debts to banks or finance companies, remov-
ing them from their books. This relieved them of the risk that customers would
50. HOWARD GILLETTE, JR., BETWEEN JUSTICE AND BEAUTY: RACE, PLANNING, AND THE FAILURE OF URBAN
POLICY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 153–54 (1995).
51. The overall population of the District of Columbia rose from 663,091 to 763,956. Id. The black
population rose from 187,266 to 411,737. Id. The white population fell from 474,326 to 345,263.
Id. at 153.
52. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS (1968), reprinted in Consumer Protection Legislation for the District
of Columbia: Hearing on S. 316, S. 2589, S. 2590, and S. 2592 Before the Subcomm. on Bus. &
Commerce of the S. Comm. on the Dist. of Columbia, 90th Cong. 257 (1968).
53. Id.
54. Nationwide, approximately 20% of households were poor, while the District of Columbia rate
was 10.5%. Frank Porter, District Poverty Rate Lower than Average of Other City Areas, WASH. POST,
Mar. 4, 1964, at E1. Only 6% of white families in the District of Columbia lived below the poverty line
of $3,000 per year. Id. A quarter of the District of Columbia’s households were nonwhite, but these
households accounted for more than one half of those earning less than $3,000 per year in 1960. United
Planning Org., An Attack on Poverty in the National Capital Metropolitan Area 16 (Sept. 22, 1964)
(unpublished first draft) (Microfilm Reel 2250, Grant PA64–183, Ford Foundation Archives).
55. U.S. KERNER COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1
(1968).
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fail to pay and of the administrative burdens of tracking account balances.56
Many urban merchants, however, could not sell their consumer debts to a
finance company and so, like Walker-Thomas Furniture, they assumed the risk
of defaulting debtors and the cost of servicing consumers’ accounts. As one
historian observed, “[e]ven as poor Americans evinced consumer desires of the
1960s, their credit experiences remained more akin to the world of the 1920s.”57
In the two-tiered credit economy, Williams and her neighbors were trapped at
the bottom.
Walker-Thomas Furniture arrived on Ora Lee Williams’s doorstep in the form
of agent “# 15,” Mr. Wolfson.58 Williams made her first purchase from Wolfson
on December 17, 1957. She bought a wallet, two pairs of solid-colored drapes,
an apron set, a potholder set, and a set of throw rugs. As Williams later testified,
at the time she signed this and several subsequent contracts, “[t]here was no
price, or anything filled in.” Although the form contract was short—approxi-
mately six inches long—the salesman would fold over the contract before
presenting it to Williams with the signature line visible and tell her, “[j]ust sign
your name down here.” Williams explained that “[s]ometimes the salesman
would say that he did not know the exact price of the merchandise, and that they
would have to add their Sales Tax, and such as that.” The salesmen would then
explain that “he could not fill it in because he wasn’t sure” and that “they would
do that later at the store.” In other words, the key term of the agreement—price—
was missing when Williams executed the contract. Williams later learned that
she owed Walker-Thomas Furniture $45.65, payable in $3.00 installments every
other Saturday. Walker-Thomas Furniture collected the tax on the purchase
(90¢) from Williams the following Saturday, when the goods were delivered.59
Over the course of the next five years, Williams signed at least thirteen
56. A 1968 Federal Trade Commission study found that D.C. retailers that appealed primarily to
“low-income” customers used installment credit in 93% of sales. “General market retailers” used
installment credit in only 27% of sales. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT
AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS (1968), reprinted in Consumer
Protection Legislation for the District of Columbia: Hearing on S. 316, S. 2589, S. 2590, and S. 2592
Before the Subcomm. on Bus. & Commerce of the S. Comm. on the Dist. of Columbia, 90th Cong.
251 (1968). On retailers and finance companies, see Louis Hyman, Ending Discrimination, Legiti-
mating Debt: The Political Economy of Race, Gender, and Credit Access in the 1960s and 1970s, 12
ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 200, 208–09 (2011).
57. Hyman, supra note 56, at 201. On the World War II origins of revolving credit, see LOUIS
HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK 98–131 (2011).
58. See Transcript of Record at 114, 116–21, 123–24, 126–28, 133, Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3389). Williams testified that she signed all but one of
the contracts at home. The contract executed at the store appears to be from December 24, 1960, when
Williams bought a bath mat set and a shower curtain. The contract was signed by “Bob” (likely
Walker-Thomas Furniture partner Robert W. Thomas), rather than Mr. Wolfson. Id. at 122.
59. Transcript of Record at 47–50, 128, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914
(D.C. 1964) (No. 3389). Perhaps as a signing bonus, Williams also received a set of canisters valued at
two dollars with her first purchase as a “free gift.” Id. at 128. See infra App. A for the full text of the
form contract, transcribed from id. at 122.
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additional contracts to buy various household goods.60 She paid Walker-Thomas
Furniture approximately $1,056 over the course of five years, out of $1,500
charged.61 Williams never received a copy of the contracts she signed. Even if
she had, the significance of the terms would not have been immediately
apparent. Buried in the middle of twenty-two lines of extremely fine print on the
pre-printed form, the agreement stated that Williams’s payments would be
credited “pro rata” on all outstanding accounts. Walker-Thomas Furniture in-
terpreted this provision, also known as an “add-on” clause, to mean that
Williams’s payments would be applied to all outstanding balances in proportion
to the amount still owed on the purchases, rather than to retiring the oldest debts
first or even pro rata in proportion to the original purchase price. In effect,
Williams would never pay off any individual item until she paid off the entire
debt owed to Walker-Thomas Furniture. In the event that she defaulted, Walker-
Thomas Furniture would retain the right to seize all of the items that Williams
had purchased since 1957. The agreement further provided that the transaction
was a “lease,” rather than an outright sale; Williams agreed to “hire” the goods
from Walker-Thomas Furniture. Williams would take actual possession of the
items, but the company would retain title to the goods until Williams had paid
off the total value of all the items she received and presented receipts to
Walker-Thomas Furniture showing full payment.62
The balance owed on the items purchased in December 1957 decreased
quickly at first, but was never extinguished, thanks to the obscure pro rata
clause in Walker-Thomas Furniture’s form agreement. According to Walker-
Thomas Furniture’s accounting scheme, by November 1962 Williams owed
only 25¢ on the original purchase of $45.65. She also owed $2.34 on a folding
60. Only fourteen contracts were admitted in evidence. Two contracts (for $53.81 and $132.55) were
not presented at trial, but they appear in Walker-Thomas Furniture’s record of Williams’s charges and
payments as contracts five and eight. Walker-Thomas Furniture’s records show sixteen contracts,
including one for a washing machine repair. In addition to the December 1957 purchases, Williams
bought another pair of drapes, a folding bed and mattress, a chest of drawers, a rug, four pairs of
curtains, four sheets, a portable fan, a portable typewriter, two (presumably toy) guns and holster sets, a
metal bed, an inner spring mattress, four kitchen chairs, a bath mat set, shower curtains, a washing
machine, and a stereo. Transcript of Record at 107, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d
914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3389) (Writ of Replevin). A law review article that cites the records from
the appeals court agrees that there were sixteen, rather than fourteen, contracts. Robert H. Skilton &
Orrin L. Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
65 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1476 (1967).
61. Wright’s opinion misstated the amount charged and paid as $1,800 and $1,400, respectively.
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1965). These were closer to
the amounts charged and paid by the Thornes, defendants in a related case. The exhibits submitted at
trial and attached to the appellate briefs show that Williams purchased $1,499.88 worth of goods and
services (misstated as $1,500.43 in one exhibit because the stereo price was misstated as $515.50 rather
than $514.95) and paid $1,056.03, owing approximately $444.40 at the time of her default. Brief for
Appellee at Exhibit B, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (No.
18604) (court record available at Records of U.S. Courts of Appeals, Record Group 276; National
Archives Building, Washington, D.C.).
62. E.g., Transcript of Record at 114, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C.
1964) (No. 3389).
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bed and chest of drawers, both purchased in August 1958 for $127.40, 3¢ on
another 1957 purchase of $13.21, and amounts ranging from 96¢ to $10.32
on other sales from 1958 through 1960.63 None of these debts would be fully
paid until Williams paid off every item purchased. Most of her payments were
applied towards the outstanding balances on her more recent purchases. Each
payment made was spread over the balances owed on all her contracts, in
proportion to the amount still owed on each.
By late 1962, Williams teetered on the edge of default. Her payments had
increased from $6.00 to $36.00 per month. She paid regularly from May
through August of 1962.64 Then she faltered, paying $102 total from September
through November. Walker-Thomas Furniture stopped accepting her payments
when she could not pay the full monthly amount due. The furniture company
then filed a lawsuit against Williams, demanding that the U.S. Marshal seize all
the items that Williams had purchased since 1957.65 On the same day the
lawsuit was filed, the clerk of the court signed off on Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture’s demand and ordered the U.S. Marshals to seize the twenty-two items
listed in the complaint.66 The Marshals took a bed and chest purchased in 1958,
along with a more recently acquired washing machine and stereo.67 The remain-
ing goods were not recovered, either because the Marshals could not locate
63. The amounts owed on other sales from 1958 through 1960 were 96¢, $1.70, $2.86, $1.08, $7.21,
$1.53, $2.38, $5.66, $10.32, and $1.61. Brief for Appellee at Exhibit B, Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (No. 18604).
64. One commentator has argued, based on the reported decision, that Williams paid approximately
10% of her monthly income to Walker-Thomas Furniture for five years in uninterrupted installments.
Spence, supra note 17, at 95–96 (discussing the assumptions that students make about Williams based
on the reported decision, including that Williams was fiscally irresponsible, and arguing that Williams
was responsible because she made regular payments of 10% of her income on her debt for many years).
This would be true if Williams regularly made payments of a similar amount each month and paid
$1,400 over five years. In fact, Williams’s initial payments were far less than 10% of her income. She
paid 90¢ in 1957; $83.36 in 1958; $140.12 in 1959; $221.97 in 1960; $359.68 in 1961 through April
1962; and $250 from May through November 1962. Brief for Appellee at Exhibit B, Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (No. 18604). Her income in this period
ranged from $179 to $218 per month. The court records also suggest that these payments were not
regular. The payment receipts in evidence are for large lump sum amounts (for example, $61.00 paid on
August 9, 1962) submitted at irregular intervals, suggesting that Williams fell behind and then caught
up for missed payments. Transcript of Record at 129, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198
A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3389).
65. Walker-Thomas Furniture filed the complaint on March 5, 1963. Transcript of Record at 104,
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3389).
66. Id. at 107.
67. Id. at 106. At that time, D.C. law permitted a creditor to repossess goods without a preseizure
hearing through the Court of General Sessions. To obtain a writ of replevin, a creditor had to file a
verified complaint and enter into an undertaking. D.C. CODE § 11-725 (1961) (later revised and codified
at D.C. CODE §§ 16-3732, 16-3733 (1967)). These provisions were eliminated with the reorganization
of the D.C. court system in 1970, but creditors could still seek a writ of replevin through the
newly-created D.C. Superior Court under D.C. CODE § 16-3701. District of Columbia Court Reform
and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, sec. 145(o), 84 Stat. 473, 564. The current
D.C. Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure require a judicial hearing before a seizure. D.C. SUP. CT.
R. CIV. P. 64-II(a)–(b).
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them or because they declined to seize them.68 At that time, Williams owed
$444.40 in total, less than the cost of her last purchase, an Admiral stereo.
Without the fine print in the Walker-Thomas Furniture contract, only the stereo
could have been repossessed.69 After seizing the property, the U.S. Marshals
appraised the items taken. They deemed the washing machine to be worthless
and valued the remaining items at $91.50.70
II. BEFORE UNCONSCIONABILITY
By the time that Williams’s goods were seized, the problems of those on the
economic margins of American society were just beginning to garner national
attention. Poverty had never disappeared, but it had receded from the view of
those reaping the benefits of postwar prosperity. Historians often describe the
1960s as a moment when poverty was “rediscovered.”71 Through popular works
like Michael Harrington’s The Other America (1962) and David Caplovitz’s The
Poor Pay More (1963), middle-class readers learned of the pockets of poverty
68. In its brief before the D.C. Circuit, Walker-Thomas Furniture stated that the other goods were
“eloigned.” Brief for Appellee at 6, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (Nos. 18604, 18605). However, the writ of replevin given to the U.S. Marshals shows check
marks next to several other items, including a fan and a typewriter. This suggests that the Marshals may
have found these items but declined to seize them. Transcript of Record at 107, Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3389) (Writ of Replevin).
69. Transcript of Record at 53–54, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C.
1964) (No. 3389). The pro rata clause allowed Walker-Thomas Furniture to retain title to all the goods
Williams had previously purchased, rather than just the last-purchased stereo. Without the fine print,
only the stereo could have been repossessed. In addition, as Douglas Baird has noted, if Walker-Thomas
Furniture had not retained a security interest in the goods and sought a money judgment against
Williams instead, most of the items Williams purchased would have been exempt from seizure to
satisfy the judgment. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, RECONSTRUCTING CONTRACTS 137–40 (2013). At that time, D.C.
law exempted most personal property from seizure, including all “beds, bedding, household furniture
and furnishings, sewing machines, radios, stoves, cooking utensils, not exceeding $300 in value.” D.C.
CODE § 15-401 (1961) (now codified at D.C. CODE § 15-501 (2014)). The stereo would not have been
protected.
70. Transcript of Record at 106, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C.
1964) (No. 3389). The washing machine was worth nothing, the stereo $75.00, the bed and mattress
$7.50 and the chest $9.00. Id.
71. The “discovery” or “rediscovery” of poverty in the 1960s is a recurring theme in the histori-
ography of the period. See, e.g., JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 97–111 (4th ed. 2003). Scholars in the 1960s also used this language. See, e.g.,
David Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 641, 647 (1968)
(“Until quite recently, it was rather fashionable for social scientists to point to the increasing homogene-
ity of American society, the blurring of class lines, as more and more people in all strata had access to
the so-called standard consumer package of appliances and automobiles. The rediscovery of the poor
and the war on poverty have served as a corrective to this picture of American society, reminding us
that inequality is still very much with us.”). In his influential 1962 study of poverty, Michael Harrington
attributed the “invisibility” of postwar poverty in part to the transformation of the American city and
suburbanization. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (Penguin
Books 1981) (1962). On the “Columbus complex” and the cyclical “rediscovery” of poverty by social
scientists like Jacob Riis and Harrington, see David Matza, The Disreputable Poor, in SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE AND MOBILITY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 310, 310–11 (Neil J. Smelser & Seymour Martin Lipset
eds., 1966).
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lurking in rural West Virginia and the ghettos of inner cities. Bypassed by the
new highways to suburban prosperity, poor urban households lived in what
Harrington called “The Other America.” As Caplovitz described, the poor also
shopped in a world apart. They were “forced to live in a world of inflation that
more well-to-do citizens [were] able to escape,” paying high rates of interest for
consumer goods bought on the installment plan.72 “Installment credit” was “the
door through which the poor . . . entered the mass consumption society.”73
Americans had been buying and selling goods for hundreds of years. But
never before had national policymakers been so unified in their support for
measures aimed at boosting the purchasing power and consumption of middle-
class households. From World War II to the mid-1970s—the heyday of Keynes-
ian capitalism—the federal government pursued policies to boost consumer
purchasing power (and thereby economic growth) through government spend-
ing, tax policy, welfare provision, and brokering industrial peace.74 Many
federal programs nurtured the growth of a mostly-white, suburban middle class.
These included the Interstate Highway Act, FHA lending policies, and the G.I.
Bill.75 For more and more households, ownership of consumer goods seemed
akin to a right of citizenship, a marker of full and equal status in the affluent
society.76 One historian has accordingly described postwar America as a “Con-
sumers’ Republic.”77
Household consumption and use of consumer credit grew exponentially in
the postwar period.78 Along with the mass production and purchase of consumer
goods came the “mass production of bargains,” in the words of commercial law
72. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES, at xv–xvii
(1967).
73. Id.
74. See LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR
AMERICA 112–65 (2003). In the postwar period, the G.I. Bill provided veterans with low-interest home
loans and educational benefits, and the FHA and VA provided mortgage insurance to reduce the cost of
homeownership. The Wagner Act and other labor legislation also supported unionization and workers’
collective bargaining. The modern welfare state emerged in the New Deal, with the passage of the
Social Security Act, creating old-age insurance, unemployment insurance, and aid to poor families with
children. Subsequent legislation extended coverage to dependents and survivors of Social Security
beneficiaries and to categories of employment previously excluded.
75. See generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005).
76. For arguments by welfare recipients that full citizenship required access to consumer goods, see
FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA 39–42,
114–36 (2007). On the relationship between consumerism and citizenship generally, see COHEN, supra
note 74.
77. Historian Lizabeth Cohen coined this phrase to encapsulate the new American political eco-
nomic “strategy that emerged after the Second World War” that revolved around “promoting the
expansion of mass consumption.” COHEN, supra note 74, at 11. See generally MEG JACOBS, POCKETBOOK
POLITICS: ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005) (arguing that the New Deal and
postwar liberal coalitions were bound together by a shared interest in boosting consumer purchasing
power).
78. GEOFFREY H. MOORE & PHILIP A. KLEIN, THE QUALITY OF CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT 4 (1967)
(“Since 1945, consumer credit has expanded spectacularly. . . . By the end of 1965, total consumer debt
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scholar Karl Llewellyn.79 Llewellyn, a law professor at Columbia, understood
the benefits of standardized form agreements, including reduction of administra-
tive costs and, ultimately, savings for consumers. But these benefits also came at
a cost.
A. THE PROBLEM OF FORM AGREEMENTS AND UNEQUAL BARGAINING
The problem, Llewellyn argued, was that standardized or “form” contracts
did not conform to the general assumptions of contract law, including the
presumption that a contract clause “represents the parties’ joint judgment as to
what they want.”80 Rather, the terms might favor the drafter—the party with
greater bargaining power and expertise. Llewellyn argued that some one-sided
agreements amounted to “the exercise of unofficial government of some by
others, via private law.”81
Other scholars raised similar concerns.82 In a seminal article on the subject of
form agreements, Yale law professor Friedrich Kessler drew attention to the
problems posed by take-it-or-leave-it standardized agreements, dubbed “con-
tracts of adhesion.”83 Kessler described adhesion contracts in the language of
authoritarian politics. He argued that adhesion contracts enabled dominant
parties to “legislate by contract” in an “authoritarian manner.”84 They threat-
ened to empower a new “feudal order” of “powerful industrial and commercial
overlords.”85 Like political power, concentrated economic power posed a real
threat to freedom.
outstanding was 16 per cent of annual personal income, whereas it was 7 per cent in 1948 and 8 per
cent in 1929.”).
79. K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 700 (1939).
80. Id.
81. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 731
(1931).
82. In 1926, University of Pennsylvania law professor Austin Tappan Wright complained that courts
continued to apply outdated rules of contract to situations where they no longer applied. Rules suited to
agreements between parties of equal bargaining power did not fit situations where bargaining power
was not equal. He noted that some have called such contracts “unilateral codes” that permit the
dominant party to legislate for the “servient” party. Austin Tappan Wright, Opposition of the Law to
Business Usages, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 931 (1926). City University of New York professor Morris R.
Cohen advocated regulation of contract as necessary to protect “real liberty.” Morris R. Cohen, The
Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 587 (1933). Like Wright and Llewellyn, Cohen argued that
contract law opened the door to stronger private parties imposing their will on weaker ones in the
manner of an authoritarian regime. Id. Contract law “confers sovereignty on one party over another” by
providing access to the state’s coercive power. Id. The danger is that this power might be used “for
unconscionable purposes, such as helping those who exploit the dire need or weaknesses of their
fellows.” Id.
83. Kessler was not the first to use this term, but he did bring it into wider usage. According to
Kessler, Edwin Patterson introduced the term to American scholars in an article on insurance policies
several decades before. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 n.11 (1943) (citing Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a
Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919)). Kessler taught at Yale from 1934 until 1938,
at the University of Chicago from 1938 to 1947, and then resumed his position at Yale until 1970.
84. Kessler, supra note 83, at 640.
85. Id.
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Kessler’s writings exemplify how far legal thinking about freedom of con-
tract had traveled from its roots in turn-of-the-century classical legal thought.86
In the first decades of twentieth century, the greatest threat to this freedom
seemed to come from government intrusion on private agreements. Judges
struck down laws that they found unconstitutionally interfered with a person’s
“right” to contract, most often when the law infringed on a worker’s right to sell
his labor.87 This jurisprudence fell within a constellation of rules that relied
upon the distinction between the public and private spheres. Private economic
rights could not be infringed except when necessary for the health, welfare, or
safety of the public. Courts had to set the boundary between that which could be
regulated (the public) and that which could not (the private). But these formalist
distinctions began to come apart under the scrutiny of the next generation of
legal thinkers.88
Llewellyn and Kessler both entered the academy in the 1920s and 1930s, the
heyday of American Legal Realism.89 Realists like Llewellyn and Kessler cared
about what judges and litigants actually did, in addition to the legal concepts
deployed to justify their actions. Real-world practice, rather than pure theory,
mattered.90 The Realists advanced the critique of “freedom of contract” begun
by Progressive-era thinkers like Roscoe Pound.91 Robert Hale, Llewellyn’s
Realist colleague at Columbia, argued that freedom of contract was always
limited because coercion was widespread. Private coercive power posed as great
a threat to individual liberty as state power. Llewellyn, too, had little use for
theoretical defenses of freedom of contract.92 He observed a “law . . . built in
the ideology of Adam Smith . . . meshed into the new order of mass-production,
86. On “classical legal thought,” see generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
CAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 9–32 (1992); DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT
(2006); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN
AMERICA, 1886–1937 (1998).
87. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). Although Lochner and its progeny loom
large in the minds of lawyers and legal historians, the Lochner-era Court did not strike down all—or
even most—protective legislation on “freedom of contract” grounds. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN,
REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011). Five years
into the New Deal, the Court changed course and adopted a friendlier approach to economic regulation.
See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–400 (1937).
88. HORWITZ, supra note 86, at 206; KENNEDY, supra note 86, at xix.
89. Beginning in 1924, Llewellyn taught at Columbia for over two decades before he moved to the
University of Chicago, where he remained until his death in 1962. Kessler began teaching at Yale in
1934.
90. As legal historian Morton Horwitz explains, “Legal Realism was neither a coherent intellectual
movement nor a consistent or systematic jurisprudence.” HORWITZ, supra note 86, at 169. Despite the
variation with the Realist camp, Horwitz argues that “[a]ll Realists shared one basic premise—that the
law had come to be out of touch with reality.” Id. at 187.
91. Id. at 33–64; AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, at xiii (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). For
Pound’s critique, see generally Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
92. To Hale, it made little sense to impose limits on state power but none on private power. He
wrote:
Absolute freedom in economic matters is of course out of the question. The most we can
attain is a relative degree of freedom, with the restrictions on each person’s liberty as tolerable
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mass-relationships.”93
The result was doctrinal confusion. Courts continued to be bound by the
“elementary rules” of contract law, yet were unwilling to enforce adhesive
bargains as written when the outcome seemed overly harsh. So they employed
roundabout methods to avoid inequitable outcomes, such as construing terms in
ways clearly not intended by the parties or deploying the requirements of
mutuality and consideration to the benefit of the weaker party. In other words,
judges paid lip service to the common law rules before reaching an equitable
result by covert means.94 In Llewellyn’s view, these tactics created “unneces-
sary confusion and unpredictability.”95
Kessler likewise labeled the resulting opinions “highly contradictory and
confusing.”96 The real issue, he argued, was whether “the unity of the law of
contracts can be maintained in the face of the increasing use” of adhesion
contracts.97 Kessler thought not. Rather than cling to the fictional unity of
contract law, courts should develop different standards for contracts of adhe-
sion, determining the legitimate expectations of the weaker party and rewriting
the contract if necessary.98 Freedom of contract, he wrote, “must mean different
things for different types of contracts.”99 In the modern economy dominated by
powerful industrial interests, courts’ blind adherence to freedom of contract
worked an injustice to those with little bargaining power. New contracts operat-
ing within the new economic landscape demanded new rules.
B. NEW RULES FOR THE NEW CONTRACTS
The Uniform Commercial Code project offered an opportunity to promulgate
a new legal framework for form agreements. Like Kessler, the Code drafters
believed that commercial law had not kept pace with developments in industry
and society. Llewellyn served as Chief Reporter for the Code, a model set of
as we can make them. It would be impossible for everyone to have unrestricted freedom to
make use of any material goods of which there are not enough to go round.
Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 626 (1943).
93. Llewellyn, supra note 81, at 751.
94. Llewellyn, supra note 79, at 702–03.
95. Id. at 703. Llewellyn made a similar complaint in another article. See Llewellyn, supra note 81,
at 744 (arguing that “the result has been (as so often during case-law growth) confusion in doctrine and
uncertainty in outcome”).
96. Kessler, supra note 83, at 633.
97. Id. at 636.
98. Id. at 637. A 1950 student note in the Harvard Law Review proposed a similar solution. The
author suggested that courts remedy inequality of bargaining power between parties to a form
agreement by taking into consideration the nature of the inequality involved and exercising “veto power
over all unreasonable terms.” Note, Contract Clauses in Fine Print, 63 HARV. L. REV. 494, 504 (1950).
99. Kessler, supra note 83, at 642. In the same issue of the Columbia Law Review, legal scholar
Robert Hale reached the same conclusion concerning the freedom-enhancing potential of regulation.
Hale, supra note 92, at 628 (“[B]y judicious legal limitation on the bargaining power of the economi-
cally and legally stronger, it is conceivable that the economically weak would acquire greater freedom
of contract than they now have—freedom to resist more effectively the bargaining power of the strong,
and to obtain better terms.”).
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state laws governing commercial transactions.100 Nicknamed “Karl’s Kode” and
the “Lex Llewellyn” after the Chief Reporter, the Code attempted to “simplify,
clarify and modernize [commercial] law” and to create consistent national
standards for resolving disputes while also allowing business practices to evolve
through “custom, usage and agreement of the parties.”101 It set forth standards
more often than bright-line rules, anticipating that judges applying the Code
would resolve disputes in accordance with commercial practice.102
Code historian Allen Kamp describes the drafting process as a battle between
the two groups based in New York City: “Uptown” academic reformers like
Llewellyn and “Downtown” commercial bankers and merchants.103 The aca-
demic drafters were particularly concerned with inequality of bargaining power
and form agreements. As one draftsman explained, they had “a tendency to see
problems in terms of the strong against the weak.”104 The commercial interests
did not share the academics’ enthusiasm for reconfiguring power relations
through the Code.
The Code provision on unconscionability, section 2-302,105 was among the
many controversial reforms that the “Uptown” academics proposed.106 Unlike
many of their proposals, the unconscionability section of the Code survived the
contentious drafting process, albeit in weakened form.107 Section 2-302 allowed
judges to refuse to enforce “unconscionable” terms in sales contracts. The
100. Llewellyn was the Chief Reporter from 1942 until 1962. Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s
Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 541
(2000). The Code was prepared under the auspices of two sponsor organizations: the American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Homer Kripke, The
Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321, 326.
101. Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code,
27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 628 (1975) (quoting U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1962)).
102. See Maggs, supra note 100, at 543 (discussing the ways in which the Code incorporated
Llewellyn’s jurisprudential philosophy). On the difference between rules and standards, see, for
example, Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1685–87 (1976); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 23 (2000).
103. See Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949–1954,
49 BUFF. L. REV. 359, 371 (2001); Kamp, supra note 34, at 276–77.
104. Kripke, supra note 100, at 323. The 1949 draft of the Code also included additional consumer
protection provisions for secured transactions. Kamp, Downtown Code, supra note 103, at 403, 443–47.
In response to pressure from business interests, these provisions were dropped from later drafts. Id.
105. Llewellyn was especially involved in drafting Article II. Danzig, supra note 101, at 621 n.3
(“Article II was Llewellyn’s main area of interest. His wife and disciple was its second most influential
author. Both retained substantial influence over the document through the period of the 1962 official
text . . . .”). Llewellyn may have drawn on his knowledge of the German Civil Code in his work on the
U.C.C., including the provision on unconscionability. James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting
in the Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 116 (2003) (observing
that many scholars “believe that Llewellyn drew his inspiration for section 2-302 from the practice of
controlling standard terms in Germany under the general clauses of the German Civil Code”). One of
the other drafters suggested use of the word “unconscionable” at a meeting in 1942. Kamp, supra note
34, at 306–08. The provision was later codified at U.C.C. § 2-302 (1962).
106. Kamp, supra note 34, at 313.
107. Kamp, Downtown Code, supra note 103, at 415–17.
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Code did not define “unconscionable.” Rather, it directed judges to evaluate
the objectionable clause in light of the “general commercial background” and
the “needs of the particular trade or case.”108
The academic drafters plainly had at least one concrete issue in mind: the
problem of form agreements.109 An early draft of section 2-302, proposed in
1944 as section 23 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act, was directed only at
standardized form contracts.110 A 1949 draft of the “Official Comment” for
section 2-302 explained that it “intended to apply . . . the equity courts’ ancient
policy of policing contracts for unconscionability or unreasonableness.”111 It
also specified that “form” contracts might contain unconscionable clauses.112
These initial drafts of section 2-302 were mainly the work of the “Uptown”
academic drafters. The “Downtown” banking and business interests made their
mark on later versions. Their influence is apparent in the 1950 revised com-
ment, which narrowed the scope of section 2-302 by omitting references to
“unreasonableness.”113 Instead, it read:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly
against the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In the
past such policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of lan-
guage, by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determina-
tions that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of
the contract. This section is intended to allow the court to pass on the
unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to make a
conclusion of law as to its unconscionability.114
The draft thus acknowledged the problem that Kessler and Llewellyn had
earlier identified of courts policing contracts through covert tactics. However, it
omitted reference to two of their major concerns: unequal bargaining power and
form agreements. Indeed, the provision’s stated purpose was to prevent “unfair
108. U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. n.1 (1962).
109. Kripke, supra note 100, at 323 (“Some part of the [UCC drafting] staff’s suggestions came
from a tendency to see problems in terms of the strong against the weak. In particular, they were
concerned about protecting the rights of consumers.”); Comment, Policing Contracts Under the
Proposed Commercial Code, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 146, 146 (1950) (“At present the commissioners appear
primarily concerned with the difficulties resulting from an application of existing rules of assent to form
contracts.”).
110. J.H.A., Note, Unconscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 401, 402–03 (1961). The section was titled “Form Clauses, Conscionable and Unconscionable”
and pertained only to a sales contract that included “one or more form clauses.” 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: DRAFTS 24 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 1984). The 1948 draft removed this express limitation.
Kamp, supra note 34, at 334.
111. 6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS 83 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 1984).
112. Id.
113. Kamp, Downtown Code, supra note 103, at 416.
114. 10 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS 117 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 1984). Subsequent
drafts retained this portion of the Comment with miniscule changes, up through 1962. 20 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS 365 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 1984).
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surprises,” not to disturb the “allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power.”115
Initial reactions to section 2-302 were mixed. In the words of one commenta-
tor, the section appeared to be “in conflict with the maxim that courts will not
make contracts for the parties.”116 Others, however, praised the provision as a
more straightforward way of dealing with one-sided bargains. Rather than
forcing judges to resort to tortured constructions of contract terms or distortions
of other general contract rules, section 2-302 allowed them to address the
problem directly.117 Proponents reasoned that “[a]bsolute freedom of contract is
no more than a nineteenth century ideal; one which has never existed in our
law.”118 Aside from a smattering of discontented rumblings, unconscionability
did not come under heavy attack until after the Williams litigation concluded.119
C. POLICING DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CONTRACTS BEFORE THE CODE
Before the District of Columbia adopted the U.C.C. in 1963, D.C. courts
adjudicated disputes over consumer credit transactions as Kessler and Llewellyn
might have predicted. Pre-Code reported decisions from D.C. courts make no
mention of unconscionability. Indeed, before widespread adoption of the Code
in the 1960s, only a handful of courts in other jurisdictions applied the doctrine.120
In cases where D.C. courts refused to enforce one-sided credit agreements, they
grounded their decisions in traditional contract defenses, such as fraud, mistake,
lack of mutual assent, or violation of public policy.121 Otherwise, courts en-
forced credit contracts as written, as in the 1949 case of Universal Jewelry Co.
v. McIver.122
115. Kamp, Downtown Code, supra note 103, 416–17 (quoting 10 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
DRAFTS, supra note 114, at 117).
116. Ralph H. King, Suggested Changes in the Uniform Commercial Code—Sales, 33 OR. L. REV.
113, 115 (1954).
117. H.C.C., Jr., Note, Unconscionable Sales Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code, Section
2-302, 45 VA. L. REV. 583, 588 (1959); J.H.A., supra note 110, at 403.
118. H.C.C., Jr., supra note 117, at 592.
119. Yale law professor Arthur Leff was among the most vocal critics of section 2-302. He launched
the assault in Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
120. See, for example, the cases cited in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,
448 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (including Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948) and
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960)). The authors of these decisions
were likely aware of the doctrine because of the U.C.C. Judge Goodrich, the author of Wentz, was on
the Editorial Board of the U.C.C. and likely became familiar with the concept of unconscionability
through his work on the Code. See John M. Breen, The Lost Volume Seller and Lost Profits Under
U.C.C. § 2-708(2): A Conceptual and Linguistic Critique, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779, 809 (1996). The
New Jersey Supreme Court decided Henningsen after neighboring Pennsylvania had adopted the Code
and shortly before New Jersey followed suit in 1961. 1961 N.J. LAWS 722.
121. Note, An Ounce of Discretion for a Pound of Flesh: A Suggested Reform for Usury Laws,
65 YALE L.J. 105, 108 & nn.19–20 (1955) (citing cases in which courts have granted relief to a
“victimized party” by invoking fraud, lack of mutuality, etc., rather than labeling the contract uncon-
scionable); H.C.C., Jr., supra note 117, at 584 n.4 (same).
122. 68 A.2d 226, 227–28 (D.C. 1949).
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In McIver, the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld a contract for the sale of a
pair of shoes to a sixty-five-year-old coal hustler, a first-time credit buyer
earning $18 per week. With poor eyesight and only the ability “to read and write
a little,” the buyer signed the “paper entitled ‘conditional contract of sale’” with
a cross mark.123 The borrower agreed to pay $3 down and $1 per week.124 After
ruling out the traditional defenses of fraud, misrepresentation, duress, and lack
of assent, the court overturned the trial verdict for the borrower and reluctantly
found in favor of the lender. It added that “[d]istressing cases of apparent
overcharges and overselling are often encountered, but we know of no remedy
under existing law except that of education of the buying public.”125 The
borrower had no counsel at trial or on appeal.
A few years later, a local D.C. court again reluctantly found in favor of
the lender, Walker-Thomas Furniture, in a case involving an installment sales
contract.126 The furniture company sold various items on credit to pro se
defendant Elizabeth Coates between 1949 and 1952.127 Coates paid $1,482 out
of $1,687.56 charged before she defaulted.128 Citing the pro rata provision of
the conditional sales contract, Walker-Thomas Furniture demanded seizure of
all the items Coates had purchased since 1949.129 “[U]nable to satisfactorily
ascertain any legal way in which the law could be of aid in solving the
inequities of this situation,” the court found for Walker-Thomas Furniture.130 It
suggested that the problem required legislative intervention.131
District of Columbia borrowers won when they could raise other contract
defenses and, perhaps more importantly, had the benefit of legal representation.
For example, in a 1963 case, the D.C. Court of Appeals refused to enforce a
sales contract on the grounds of fraud and lack of mutual assent.132 The
borrower bought a television set on credit for the quoted price of $189 from
Hollywood Credit Clothing Company, located just down the Seventh Street
123. Id. at 227.
124. Id. at 226–27.
125. Id. at 228.
126. This decision is unpublished, but it is attached to Walker-Thomas Furniture’s brief in the
Thorne case. Coates did not have a lawyer; Harry Protas represented Walker-Thomas Furniture.
Transcript of Record at 11, Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No.
3412) (Trial Brief of Plaintiff). A 1960 case from New Jersey held that an automobile manufacturer’s
attempted disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability was “so inimical to the public good as
to compel an adjudication of its invalidity.” Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 95
(N.J. 1960) (citing proposed U.C.C. § 202 (1958)). The case appears not to have swayed the D.C.
courts.
127. Transcript of Record at 9, Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964)
(No. 3412) (Trial Brief of Plaintiff).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 9–10.
132. Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v. Gibson, 188 A.2d 348, 349–50 (D.C. 1963).
1406 [Vol. 102:1383THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
shopping corridor from Walker-Thomas Furniture.133 When the buyer returned
home, he noticed that the contract he had signed stated the price as $289, plus
carrying charges; he owed $345.35 in all.134 Evidence admitted at trial showed
that the suggested retail price of the set was $169.95.135 The borrower returned
the television immediately and the store sued for recovery of the contract
price.136 Pierre Dostert of the Bar Association’s Legal Assistance Office, who
would later take up Williams’s case, represented the borrower. The trial and
appellate court ruled in favor of the defendant, finding that there was no
meeting of the minds as to the contract terms and that the borrowers’ agreement
was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation.137 In another case from 1963, the
buyer prevailed on a procedural defense.138
Of course, most cases involving credit sales to poor consumers did not end up
before an appellate court, or even reach trial. Absent the intervention of the
Legal Assistance Office of The Bar Association of the District of Columbia, Ora
Lee Williams’s case might have ended with the loss of her furniture.139 Reposses-
sion through court action was a standard business practice for Walker-Thomas
Furniture. In the years leading up to Williams’s case, the company rarely filed
fewer than one hundred seizure requests (called “writs of replevin”) per year in
the local court.140 Most cases did not go to trial; those that did usually resulted
in a verdict for the furniture company.141
Walker-Thomas Furniture’s methods were common among retailers to the
poor. A mid-1960s Federal Trade Commission study of District of Columbia
retailers found that eleven “low-income market retailers” similar to Walker-
Thomas Furniture obtained 2690 judgments against delinquent customers in
one year alone.142 In contrast, the mainstream retailers studied reported only 70
133. Hollywood Credit Clothing Company was located at 703 7th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
Hollywood Credit Clothing Co., 77 F.T.C. 1594, 1595 (1970).
134. Gibson, 188 A.2d at 349.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 349–50.
138. Becton v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 192 A.2d 125, 126 (D.C. 1963). In Becton, Walker-
Thomas Furniture obtained a writ of replevin against the buyer to repossess the goods she purchased.
The trial court awarded Walker-Thomas Furniture judgment for possession of the goods or the amount
the buyer still owed Walker-Thomas Furniture. The D.C. Court of Appeals vacated the judgment on the
ground that the correct measure of damages in a replevin action is the value of the goods, not the
amount of the outstanding debt. Id. The case was later dismissed for failure to prosecute. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co. v. Becton, 200 A.2d 190, 191 (D.C. 1964). Attorney Catherine U. Welch
represented Becton. Id. at 190.
139. See Pierre E. Dostert, Appellate Restatement of Unconscionability: Civil Legal Aid at Work,
54 A.B.A. J. 1183, 1183 (1968).
140. Id. at 1184.
141. Id.
142. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS (March 1968), reprinted in Consumer Protection Legislation for the
District of Columbia: Hearing on S. 316, S. 2589, S. 2590, and S. 2592 Before the Subcomm. on Bus. &
Commerce of the S. Comm. on the Dist. of Columbia, 90th Cong. 255, 278 (1968).
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judgments.143 Low-income market retailers averaged one lawsuit for every
$2,599 in net sales; mainstream retailers averaged one for every $232,299 in net
sales.144 These figures suggest that low-income retailers employed “a marketing
technique which includes actions against default as a normal matter of business
rather than as a matter of last resort.”145 Most cases ended in judgment for the
merchant because the buyer never appeared, in some cases because he or she
never received notice of the lawsuit.146 Perhaps unwittingly, courts had become
collection agents for low-income retailers.147
III. A JUDICIAL SOLUTION
Williams’s case was unusual in that it came to trial and then proceeded
through multiple appeals. After Walker-Thomas Furniture seized her belongings
in March 1963, Williams found her way to the D.C. Bar Association’s Legal
Assistance Office housed in the D.C. trial court, then called the Court of
General Sessions.148 Federally funded legal services for the poor were not yet
up and running in the District of Columbia.149 The Legal Assistance Office had
received other complaints against Walker-Thomas Furniture, but the borrowers
were not poor enough to qualify for free legal assistance.150 The office agreed to
defend Williams against Walker-Thomas Furniture.
Williams’s attorneys also represented two married codefendants, William and
Ruth Thorne, in a separate collection action filed by the furniture company. Like
Williams, the Thornes fit the profile of most Walker-Thomas Furniture custom-
ers. They lived in a predominantly black neighborhood, where over a quarter of
143. Id. at 278.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 255.
146. One study found that 97% of cases filed by Harlem merchants ended in default judgments.
Abuse of Process: Sewer Service, 3 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 17, 18 (1967). Merchants sometimes
used “sewer service,” meaning they employed a process server who falsely claimed to have served
notice of the lawsuit on the borrower. Id. at 17–18. Other retailers avoided an adversarial proceeding by
requiring borrowers to sign a “confession of judgment” as a condition of receiving credit. Upon default,
they could move straight to a collection action. See Dostert, supra note 139, at 1184.
147. Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, supra note 13.
148. Dostert, supra note 139, at 1183.
149. The Legal Assistance Office was established in 1937. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON LEGAL AID
OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 75 (1958). The first program in the District of
Columbia, Neighborhood Legal Services, started under the auspices of the United Planning Organiza-
tion. It began in 1964 with the aid of a grant from the Ford Foundation, later supplemented by federal
funds allocated as part of President Johnson’s War on Poverty. On the history of the program, see Brian
Gilmore, Love You Madly: The Life and Times of the Neighborhood Legal Services Program of
Washington, D.C., 10 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 69 (2007).
150. Dostert, supra note 139, at 1183. According to Williams’s lawyer, Williams was not a carefully
selected test case. The Legal Assistance Office had declined to represent other Walker-Thomas
Furniture customers because they were not financially eligible for help and could retain private counsel.
The office decided to represent Williams because she qualified for free assistance and offered an
opportunity to challenge Walker-Thomas Furniture’s business practices. Id.
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families lived in poverty.151 William Thorne, a supermarket porter, had a third
grade education and could barely read. The Thornes defaulted on their debt to
Walker-Thomas Furniture after paying approximately $1,422 on $1,855 owed.
William Thorne fell ill for two weeks in the summer of 1962 and could not keep
up with his regular payments on their purchases of household goods. After
refusing partial payment, the store seized their television, refrigerator, freezer,
sofa, and a few other items.152
The lawyer who would argue the case before Judge Wright, Pierre Dostert,153
“decided to take the two cases as far as necessary to achieve a precedent which
would afford some protection to the lesser members of the community.”154 (The
two cases were later consolidated on appeal.) Meeting that goal would end up
requiring two appeals and 210 hours of legal work.155 Paying for hundreds of
hours of legal work would have been prohibitively expensive for Williams, a
poor debtor who could not even afford to pay $36 a month to stave off
repossession of her belongings. Without free legal representation, Williams
would surely have joined the hundreds of borrowers whose cases ended either
in default or in a verdict for Walker-Thomas Furniture.
A. THE WILLIAMS TRIAL AND INITIAL APPEAL
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Williams failed to raise unconscionability as a de-
fense at her trial on June 4, 1963.156 Congress did not adopt the U.C.C. until
December of that year, and no D.C. court had applied the doctrine as a principle
of the common law.157 Instead, Williams’s counsel argued that there was a lack
of mutual assent to the contract, that the contract was vague and ambiguous,
151. The Thornes moved between two census tracts during the time of these purchases, between
1958 and 1962. Their first apartment (in the 70 block of K St. NW) was in a tract that was 88.1%
African-American and in which 43% of families earned less than $3,000 per year in 1960. Their second
apartment (in the 2100 block of 5th St. NW) was in a tract that was 98.5% black and in which 35.8% of
families earned less than $3,000 per year in 1960. Data for D.C. Census Tracts 34 and 47 (1960),
SOCIAL EXPLORER, http://www.socialexplorer.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). For discussion of poverty
line estimates for 1960, see supra note 42.
152. According to the agreed upon statement of proceedings on appeal, Thorne testified at trial that
he “was unable to read and write in that his education was up through the third grade. He was able to
write his name, and to read with difficulty by spelling out each individual word.” Transcript of Record
at 37, Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3412) (Settled
Statement of Proceedings and Evidence). The parties disagreed on the exact amount owed and paid to
Walker-Thomas Furniture. On Thorne’s occupation, see Dostert, supra note 139, at 1184.
153. Dostert was a 1959 graduate of Georgetown Law. Between 1960 and 1964, he split his time
between private practice and part-time work at the Legal Assistance Office. Dostert, supra note 139,
at 1185. Dostert was in practice with lawyer Samuel C. Borzilleri by the time the case reached the D.C.
Court of Appeals in 1963. Dostert and Borzilleri appear as counsel on the brief. Transcript of Record
at 12, Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3412) (Trial Brief of
Defendants).
154. Skilton & Helstad, supra note 60, at 1480 n.38.
155. Id.
156. See generally discussion supra Part II.
157. Section 2-302 concerned unconscionable contracts. In the congressional hearing on the pro-
posed adoption of the U.C.C. for the District of Columbia, none of the witnesses mentioned this
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that the ambiguous terms should be construed against the furniture company,
and that the contract should be interpreted in light of the acts of the parties and
their interpretations of the contract. Williams conceded that Walker-Thomas
Furniture had a right to recoup the amounts still owed on the stereo purchase
but argued that seizure of her property was illegal.158 Ralph R. Curry, a
volunteer with the Legal Assistance Office, represented Williams.159 Harry
Protas, a local lawyer who specialized in debt collection and creditors’ rights,
appeared on behalf of Walker-Thomas Furniture.160
Williams appeared as the only witness for the defense. On direct examina-
tion, her lawyer made sure to “bring out the fact” that Williams was “on relief”
and supporting the household on her own.161 Williams testified that she would
not have bought the stereo if she had known she could lose her other pur-
chases from Walker-Thomas Furniture, including a washing machine, if she
failed to complete payments on the stereo.162 At the time she fell behind, she
thought that she had “paid all of the amount covering the washing machine, and
some on the stereo.”163 She first became aware that the stereo and her prior
purchases had not been paid off when she went to the Walker-Thomas Furniture
store to talk to the credit manager “about two weeks before they came and took
my furniture.”164 The record contains no explanation about why Williams
decided to buy the stereo. (Counsel for Walker-Thomas Furniture objected when
Williams’s counsel posed the question.)
On cross-examination, the lawyer for Walker-Thomas Furniture repeatedly
asked Williams about her understanding of the contract terms. Williams testified
that she did not understand the meaning of the term pro rata, and that she never
received a copy of the contracts she signed. Near the end of her testimony, she
grew frustrated by opposing counsel’s persistent inquiries about the contract
language. She asked counsel for Walker-Thomas Furniture: “But how could I
read things that I did not have[?] You are asking me about reading things that I
section. Hearing on H.R. 5338 Before the Subcomm. on Bus. & Commerce of the S. Comm. on the Dist.
of Columbia, 88th Cong. (1963).
158. Transcript of Record at 73, 76, 81, 85, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914
(D.C. 1964) (No. 3389). The Thornes raised the same defenses as Williams at trial. They did not raise
unconscionability. Transcript of Record at 12–19, Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d
914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3412) (Trial Brief of Defendants).
159. Curry represented Williams at trial and filed the initial appeal. Transcript of Record at 1, 136,
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3389). Curry volunteered
for the Legal Assistance Office. Dostert, supra note 139, at 1184.
160. The Protas firm continued to practice in this area. Firm History, PROTAS, SPIVOK, & COLLINS,
LLC, http://www.psclaw.net/Firm_History.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). Protas died in 1981. Social
Security Administration, Social Security Death Index Entry for Number 579–52–3533, available at
http://search.ancestrylibrary.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
161. Transcript of Record at 45, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C.
1964) (No. 3389).
162. Id. at 53.
163. Id. at 54.
164. Id. at 62.
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never had to read.”165
In his closing remarks, counsel for Walker-Thomas Furniture argued that a
verdict in favor of Williams would mean an end to “freedom of contract.”166
Although Williams did not have a lawyer by her side when she signed the
contracts, she had “every opportunity to acquaint herself with” the contract
terms. Walker-Thomas Furniture could not be blamed for Williams’s failure to
“find out what ‘pro rata’ meant.” That was “her own fault.” She was “careless or
derelict insofar as signing the contract,” he argued.167 Williams and the Thornes
both lost, in separate trials before the D.C. Court of General Sessions, and
immediately appealed.168
Before the D.C. Court of Appeals, Williams raised the same defenses as at
trial, adding that the contracts were “against public policy.” Williams’s brief,
submitted to the appellate court in late 1963, came close to making the claim
that the pro rata provision was unconscionable, but the argument remained
entangled with other defenses and couched in general policy terms. The brief
mentioned unconscionable contracts in a section on fraud, arguing that “the
facts indicate such a disregard of policy considerations as to be considered
unconscionable.”169 The contract, Williams claimed, was “similar to a contract
of adhesion” to which “the usual contract rules based on the idea of ‘freedom of
contract’ cannot be applied rationally.”170 Neither side mentioned the U.C.C.,
which Congress had considered but not yet enacted for the District of Colum-
bia.171 The Thornes, likewise, did not raise unconscionability as a defense but
noted that the court could use its “equitable powers” when presented with an
165. Id. at 65.
166. Id. at 70.
167. Id. at 70–71.
168. Id. at 109–10 (Judgment without written opinion dated July 18, 1963, and Notice of Appeal);
Transcript of Record at 21–22, Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No.
3412) (Judgment without written opinion dated July 26, 1963, and Notice of Appeal). The Thorne case
came before Judge Reeves. Ora Marshino and Dostert appeared for the Thornes at trial. Reeves noted in
the statement of proceedings on appeal that the court objected to Walker-Thomas Furniture’s practices
but could find no way to rule in Thorne’s favor. Transcript of Record at 38, Thorne v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3412) (Settled Statement of Proceedings and Evidence)
(“Following argument of counsel, the Court stated that it felt that plaintiff was being very arbitrary in
seizing the property under a writ of replevin after the defendant had maintained his payments for a
number of years, and indicated that it would not permit this if such could be avoided.”).
169. Brief of Appellant at 6, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964)
(No. 3389). The brief also cited Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), an
unconscionability decision involving the sale of a defective car and a form contract requiring the buyer
to waive the implied warranty of merchantability.
170. Brief of Appellant at 11, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964)
(No. 3389).
171. In August 1963, Congress held hearings on whether to adopt the U.C.C. for the District of
Columbia. Hearing on H.R. 5338 Before the Subcomm. on Bus. & Commerce of the S. Comm. on the
Dist. of Columbia, 88th Cong. (1963). It enacted the U.C.C. on December 30, 1963, effective January 1,
1965. Act of Dec. 30, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-243, 77 Stat. 630.
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“unconscionable case” to reach a “just result.”172
Williams’s brief also emphasized her helplessness and dependency, arguing
that Williams, “being on public assistance[,] is in effect a ward of the state and
as such is entitled to care, comfort and freedom from, deceitful, fraudulent
practices.”173 In addition, “[a] person in such a position is in that position
because he is unable to do all the things for himself that others can do. He
labors under a handicap of necessity and it is against public policy to allow the
crafty to take unfair advantage of that necessity.”174 In other words, Williams’s
status as a welfare recipient made her purchases and credit arrangements a
matter of public concern. In the Thorne brief, counsel similarly emphasized the
defendant’s limited education.175 The brief also attacked Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture, likening the retailer to a “modern day Shylock[]” who “may extract the
historical pound of flesh, with the blessing of the judiciary in doing so.”176
But Walker-Thomas Furniture won again. The Court of Appeals threw up its
hands, lamenting that there was no remedy under existing law. One of the
judges on the three-member panel, Frank Myers, must have been particularly
frustrated. Over a decade before, he had demanded that Congress enact correc-
tive legislation in his opinion reluctantly finding in favor of Walker-Thomas
Furniture in the Coates case. In Williams, the Court of Appeals acknowledged
that Williams was a person of limited education but found no evidence of fraud
or mutual misunderstanding. The court was no fan of Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture’s “exploitive” contracts or its decision to sell a $514 stereo set to a woman
on relief who “had to feed, clothe and support both herself and seven children”
on $218 per month.177 “We cannot condemn too strongly [Walker-Thomas
Furniture’s] conduct,” the court wrote, emphasizing that “[i]t raises serious
questions of sharp practice and irresponsible business dealings.”178 Yet, there
was “no ground upon which this court can declare the contracts in question
contrary to public policy.”179 The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in
favor of Walker-Thomas Furniture in both cases and again urged legislative
172. Brief of Appellants at 4, Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964)
(No. 3412).
173. Brief of Appellant at 9, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964)
(No. 3389) (emphasis added).
174. Id. Some scholars have criticized Judge Wright because his opinion “leads readers to see
Williams and other members of subordinated groups as defective and to ignore the fact of racism and
other systems of social oppression.” Kastely, supra note 22, at 306. It is clear from the record that these
assumptions did not originate with Wright, but with Williams’s lawyer.
175. Brief of Appellants at 3, Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964)
(No. 3412) (“Appellant in the case at bar, a person with a third grade education was limited in his
ability to read.”).
176. Id. at 4.
177. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. 1964).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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action to curtail future abuses.180 Both Williams and the Thornes petitioned for
review by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.181
Although the D.C. Circuit rarely granted discretionary requests for review, a
three-judge panel voted to hear both cases and consolidated them for purposes
of briefing and argument.182 They left no record of their reasoning. Perhaps, as
Karl Llewellyn observed, the “battle ground” on which legal generalizations are
tested “is and must always be the marginal and even pathological case.”183 Or
perhaps the first sentence of Williams’s statement of the case grabbed the
judges’ attention: “Appellant, a person of limited education and separated from
her husband, is maintaining herself and her seven children by means of public
assistance.”184
Two of the three judges who granted review, Judge Skelly Wright and
Chief Judge David Bazelon, were concerned about the plight of the poor.185
Bazelon maintained a folder of clippings from the Washington Post and reports
on the subject of poverty.186 Judge Wright, who would author the decision in the
Williams case, chaired the special committee of the Judicial Council that
reviewed a grant proposal to the Ford Foundation seeking funding to establish a
neighborhood legal services program for the poor.187 Years later, he published a
forceful 1969 editorial in The New York Times entitled The Courts Have Failed
180. Id. The case was argued before the D.C. Court of Appeals on February 3, 1964, and decided on
March 30, 1964. Id. at 914.
181. At this time, the D.C. Court of Appeals was not the highest court in the District of Columbia.
Before the Court Reorganization Act of 1970, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had
discretion to review of judgments of the D.C. Court of Appeals. Theodore R. Newman, Jr., The State of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 453, 454 (1978).
182. On the frequency that the court granted requests for review, see Dostert, supra note 139,
at 1185.
183. Llewellyn, supra note 81, at 750.
184. Brief for Petition for Allowance of an Appeal at 1, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (No. 18604). Thorne was similarly described as “a person with a third
grade education” and “a nominal income.” Brief of Petitioners in Support of Petition for Allowance of
Appeal at 3, Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (No. 18605).
185. Each week, a three-judge panel would review motions to the court, including petitions for
review. D.C. Circuit judges were assigned to a motions panel at random, and the panels rotated
regularly. Separately-constituted three-judge panels were also assigned to hear and decide cases on
appeal. It is a remarkable coincidence that Wright and Bazelon were both assigned to the motions panel
that granted review in Williams and to the panel that decided the case. Interview with William Whitford,
Professor, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., in Madison, Wis. (June 13, 2013). The third member of the review
panel was Judge Fahy. Order Granting Appeal (July 22, 1964), Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (No. 18604).
186. Bazelon’s papers include a folder entitled “Poverty Clippings” and three folders containing
poverty reports from 1958–1962, 1963–1965, and 1966–1975. David L. Bazelon Papers, Biddle Law
Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School (Subject Files Poverty Clippings Folder, Box 180;
Subject Files Poverty Reports, 1958–1962, 1963–1965, 1966–1975, Boxes 179 and 180). The Post
clippings include the following articles: Eve Edstrom, Assault on Poverty by Education Urged, WASH.
POST, Dec. 14, 1963, at A1; Eve Edstrom, One Out of 10 Americans Lives in ‘Abject Poverty,’ Study
Reveals, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1963, at A1; Sue Gronk, Way Out of Poverty For a Man is a Job, WASH.
POST, Feb. 26, 1964, at D1.
187. EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES
PROGRAM 28–29 (1974).
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the Poor, critiquing the legal treatment of the low income.188
B. BEFORE THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Williams’s attorneys fully briefed unconscionability as a defense only after
Congress had adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, when the case was
on appeal to the D.C. Circuit. There, Williams and the Thornes argued that
Walker-Thomas Furniture’s “conduct” was unconscionable. Specifically, they
objected to the printing of the contracts in “microscopic type size” and failing to
inform defendants about the lease and pro rata provisions of the contract.189
The unconscionability section of the brief was short, taking up only two out of
eighteen pages of argument.190 Williams’s counsel recognized that the U.C.C.
was not effective when the contracts at issue were signed, but argued that the
Code “is a restatement of law, founded upon the common law.”191 Walker-
Thomas Furniture responded that the U.C.C. did not bar conditional sales
agreements and that the express terms of the contract and course of dealing
supported the trial court’s ruling for Walker-Thomas Furniture. Further, Con-
gress had not enacted any law regulating the use of particular type sizes or a
“Retail Installment Sales Law” for the District of Columbia that would govern
the terms of installment sales.192
Counsel for defendants also hammered home that Williams was a person of
“limited educational achievement” and suggested that her “mental weakness”
and below average intelligence were concerns. Williams’s “ability to understand
the instruments was limited by virtue of an eighth grade education.”193 Fur-
thermore, Walker-Thomas Furniture took unfair advantage of Williams’s circum-
stances. Its conduct “from the very outset is an outrage,” Williams’s counsel
added, meaning “selling a stereo record player to a woman on relief with seven
children and a monthly relief payment of $218.00.”194 Counsel cautioned that
failure to apply equitable principles to Walker-Thomas Furniture’s enforcement
action could have dramatic consequences. Foreshadowing the violence that
broke out in cities across the nation in the mid-1960s, Williams’s attorneys
warned:
188. Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, supra note 13.
189. Brief for Appellants at 13, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (Nos. 18604, 18605).
190. Id. at 12–13.
191. Id. at 12. Defendants also argued, for the first time on appeal, that the pro rata provision of the
contract violated the spirit of the District of Columbia’s exemption statute, D.C. CODE § 15-401 (1961)
(now codified at D.C. CODE § 15-501), which barred creditors from seizing a debtor’s household
furniture and other personal property in order to satisfy a money judgment. Id. at 24–26.
192. Brief for Appellee at 19–23, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (Nos. 18604, 18605).
193. Brief for Appellants at 3, 9, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (Nos. 18604, 18605). The brief casts Williams as a victim in order to advance the defendants’
legal arguments. It is difficult to gauge from the record how much Williams actually understood about
the terms of the sale.
194. Id. at 5, 7, 9, 23.
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Each time there is a substantial injustice in a court, there is in like degree a
lessening of respect for the law, and the emotions of anger and hate directed
towards those persons pursuing injustice, and general antipathy toward the
community which permits a system of law capable of injustice to exist.195
In the order granting appellate review, the federal appeals court appointed
union-side labor lawyer Gerhard P. Van Arkel to act as amicus curiae.196 The
order provided no reason for the appointment and Van Arkel suggested in his
brief that the court had provided no guidance as to what he should discuss.197
Either on his own initiative or in accordance with an unwritten directive from
the court,198 Van Arkel decided to focus on the impact of the newly enacted
U.C.C. He wrote that the Code imposed a new “statutory framework for dealing
with the ‘unconscionable’ agreement.”199 Van Arkel endorsed the defendants’
position that the Code was “declaratory rather than amendatory of the common
law.”200 The brief also provided an overview of the relevant case law on
unconscionability and criteria a court might use in evaluating an agreement
under section 2-302. Van Arkel concluded that in these cases, “there is at least a
prima facie showing of an unconscionable transaction; a series of dealings with
disadvantaged persons, known to the merchant to be such, evidenced by highly
legalized, fine print, documents, resulting in a forfeiture.”201 He suggested that
the court might direct a new trial because the record was devoid of findings
related to unconscionability.202
195. Id. at 11.
196. It is not clear why the court appointed Van Arkel or what stake he had in the outcome of the
litigation. Van Arkel was a founding partner of Van Arkel & Kaiser, a union-side labor law firm. The
firm later merged with another firm to become Bredhoff & Kaiser. Prior to entering private practice,
Van Arkel served as General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board under Truman. He
resigned the post in protest after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. J.Y. Smith, Gerhard P. Van Arkel,
77, Former Counsel of NLRB, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1984, at D6. Then-Howard Law School professor
Egon Guttman and Howard law student Bobby L. Hill provided assistance on the brief. Brief of
Gerhard Van Arkel as Amicus Curiae at 17, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (Nos. 18604, 18605).
197. Van Arkel emphasized the difficulty of his charge in the amicus brief. He wrote: “The filing of a
brief amicus in cases such as these is not without its hazards, for counsel is required to make a
judgment as to the issues which may, or should, interest the Court and may err in so doing.” Brief of
Gerhard Van Arkel as Amicus Curiae at 1, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (Nos. 18604, 18605).
198. Howard law student Bobby L. Hill, who provided assistance to Van Arkel on the brief,
explained in a subsequent law review article that the court appointed an amicus to analyze “the
perplexing contours of the problem of having the Uniform Commercial Code adopted but ineffective in
the jurisdiction.” Bobby L. Hill, Note, Commercial Law—Poor Education and Low Economic Status of
a Party to an Installment Sales Contract Determinant of Whether Unconscionable Bargain Was Made,
12 HOW. L.J. 164, 169 (1966). Hill died in 2000. Controversial Civil Rights Activist Dies, SAVANNAH
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 3, 2000, http://savannahnow.com/stories/120200/LOChilldeath.shtml.
199. Brief of Gerhard Van Arkel as Amicus Curiae at 2, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Nos. 18604, 18605).
200. Id. at 2–3.
201. Id. at 15.
202. Id. at 16.
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Williams and the companion case, Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
came up for oral argument before the three-judge panel of Skelly Wright, David
Bazelon, and John Danaher in April 1965.203 The case was argued on a Friday
morning.204 By the following Monday, Wright had written a first draft of the
opinion finding in favor of Williams and the Thornes.205 It was styled “per
curiam,” meaning that it would be attributed to the court as a whole, rather than
to an individual judge.206
It was also short, less than twenty-five lines long not including five para-
graphs excerpted directly from the D.C. Court of Appeals decision.207 Because
the U.C.C. was not in effect at the time of the transactions, the decision relied
on the common law doctrine of unconscionability.208 Tracking the language of
the amicus brief, the court found that the U.C.C. provision on unconscionable
contracts was “declaratory of the common law” and that unconscionability
analysis should be applied on remand.209 It would be up to the trial court to
determine whether the contract was in fact unconscionable.210
C. REMAKING THE “LAW OF THE POOR”
Wright quickly jettisoned this modest approach, however. In the first draft
circulated to the panel, he included more detail about Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture’s course of conduct and dropped the per curiam attribution. As his later
writings make clear, Wright viewed Walker-Thomas Furniture’s general busi-
203. Letter from Nathaniel J. Paulson, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, to R. R.
Curry & Pierre E. Dostert, Counsel for Appellants, Harry Protas, Counsel for Appellee, and Gerhard P.
Van Arkel, Amicus Curiae (Mar. 18, 1965) (Case File 18604; U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit; Records of U.S. Courts of Appeals, Record Group 276, National Archives and Records
Administration).
204. The case was argued at 10:30 a.m. on April 9, 1965. Id.
205. The first Wright draft of the opinion is dated April 12, 1965. Draft Opinion of Judge Skelly
Wright, at 1 (Apr. 12, 1965) (Wright Papers, Box 77, Folder 1965 September term, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress).
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Although the Williams decision technically relied on the common law doctrine, rather than the
U.C.C. provision, it did not suggest that the common law doctrine was in any way different from
the U.C.C. provision. As one scholar remarked, Williams “clearly would have been decided on the
basis of [U.C.C. §] 2-302 had the statute been in effect at the time of the relevant transaction, and in
fact was decided as if the section were the law of the jurisdiction.” Leff, supra note 119, at 551.
209. Draft Opinion of Judge Skelly Wright, at 1 (Apr. 12, 1965) (Wright Papers, Box 77, Folder
1965 September term, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); see also Brief of Gerhard Van Arkel
as Amicus Curiae at 2–3, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(Nos. 18604, 18605) (asserting that the “Code is declaratory rather than amendatory of the common
law”).
210. In the final opinion, Wright hedged on whether unconscionability was a new doctrine in the
District of Columbia. He avoided the question, noting that, even if the doctrine were not already part of
the common law, the court might adopt it “in the exercise of its powers to develop the common law for
the District of Columbia.” Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
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ness practices as the root of the problem. Courts, in his opinion, were complicit
in sanctioning these practices. They “appl[ied] ancient legal doctrines which
merely compound the plight of the poverty-stricken.”211 Instead, they should
strive to change social policy “to liberate the urban poor from their degrada-
tion.”212 Judges “can and must participate in bringing about that change by
changing the law,” Wright later wrote.213
Accordingly, in the first draft circulated to Bazelon, Danaher, and the rest of
the court in June, Wright focused on Walker-Thomas Furniture’s conduct, rather
than the defendants’ knowledge and understanding of the transactions. He
noted:
In both the Williams and the Thorne cases, shortly before the furniture store
sought repossession, a large purchase was made. It might be shown that at the
time of these purchases [Walker-Thomas] knew, or obviously should have
known, that, because of the purchaser’s circumstances, a default in monthly
payments and, hence, repossession of all items purchased in the past three
years would almost inevitably ensue. It might also appear that on resale of
repossessed items [Walker-Thomas] usually realizes, by resale or otherwise,
an amount greater than the debt secured by the items, and perhaps greater than
the valuation given the items at the time of repossession.214
In a footnote, he further instructed the lower court that it should consider the
relationship of the price charged to the value of the items sold to Williams and
admit evidence “to show whether the stereo set sold the appellant Williams was
new or repossessed and whether, new or repossessed, it had a market value
anywhere near $514.”215
Wright’s framing of the problem thus departed from the defendants’ focus on
the individual quirks of the Williams and Thorne transactions. In their briefs,
the lawyers for Williams and the Thornes presented the facts of their cases in
terms resonant with a centuries-old discourse about the deserving poor.216
Defendants appeared intellectually deficient, helpless, and in need of protection.
They were people with “limited educational achievement” and “mental weak-
211. Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, supra note 13.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Draft Opinion of Judge Skelly Wright, at 6–7 (June 29, 1965) (Wright Papers, Box 77, Folder
1965 September term, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). This section was later deleted from
the opinion, but reappeared in Wright’s 1969 New York Times article. There, Wright wrote: “Perhaps it
was more than coincidence that Walker-Thomas sold Mrs. Williams a stereo just when she was nearing
the final payment on all her previous purchases and would then own the goods outright.” Wright, The
Courts Have Failed the Poor, supra note 13.
215. Draft Opinion of Judge Skelly Wright, at 8 n.10 (June 29, 1965) (Wright Papers, Box 77,
Folder 1965 September term, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
216. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR 9–35 (1989).
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ness,”217 the “lowliest of our society.”218 The description of Williams, in par-
ticular, evoked the worthy widow: a single mother who subsisted on “public
relief payments from the Government.”219 Counsel undoubtedly invoked these
stereotypes strategically to obtain relief for their clients. Wright, however, took
a more structural approach in his analysis.
In Wright’s view, the background and intelligence of the poor borrowers—
Williams and the Thornes—were less important than the tyranny of the lender-
seller or, as Wright later dubbed it, the “manufacturer-seller-financier complex.”220
Wright’s theory of the transactions is clear in the original drafts. In his view,
Walker-Thomas Furniture likely sold used goods as new, at prices well above
their real market value.221 The company made a practice of selling high-priced
items to its customers with the knowledge that they would likely default and
repossession of all of the items purchased would “inevitably ensue.”222 The
company could then resell the items to the next customer, perhaps recouping an
“amount greater than the debt secured by the items” and “greater than the
valuation given the items at the time of repossession.”223 He concluded that if
“this should prove to be the case, and as a matter of practice [Walker-Thomas]
makes no attempt to remit this surplusage to the defaulting purchaser, the
conscionability of the sales contracts which permit such a result might certainly
be questioned.”224
Before the next round of drafts went out to the full court, Danaher advised
Wright that he planned to dissent. He explained that, “[c]ases on the equity side
seem to me not applicable as we review a decision of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals,” and that the “situation calls for congressional scrutiny.” In
other words, “the remedy does not lie with this court.”225 Danaher took issue
with Wright’s characterization of Williams, asserting instead that she “seems to
have known precisely where she stood.”226 He suggested that the majority was
treating Williams differently because she was on relief: “Is public oversight to
be required of the expenditures of relief funds?” he asked the majority.227
Danaher suggested instead that a remedy might be found within the District of
217. Brief for Appellants at 9, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (Nos. 18604, 18605).
218. Id. at 11.
219. Id. at 2.
220. Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, supra note 13.
221. Draft Opinion of Judge Skelly Wright, at 8 n.10 (June 29, 1965) (Wright Papers, Box 77,
Folder 1965 September term, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
222. Id. at 6.
223. Id. at 6–7.
224. Id. at 7.
225. Memorandum from Hon. John Danaher to Hon. J. Skelly Wright and Hon. David L. Bazelon
(July 22, 1965) (Wright Papers, Box 77, Folder 1965 September term, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress).
226. Draft Dissent of Judge Danaher, at 1 (July 22, 1965) (Wright Papers, Box 77, Folder 1965
September term, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
227. Id.
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Columbia’s “Loan Shark” law.228 In his view, Wright’s ruling threatened the
validity of the “thousands upon thousands” of installment contracts signed
every year in the District of Columbia.229
Danaher was right. Wright’s initial approach was broad, perhaps danger-
ously so. Walker-Thomas Furniture’s contracts with Williams and the Thornes
were on pre-printed forms used in every credit sale the company made.
Further, Wright’s draft suggested that these contracts might be unconscionable
because of these terms and an ongoing pattern of conduct by the seller, rather
than isolated defects in individual transactions. Finally, Wright’s legal pro-
nouncement—that the common law of the District of Columbia authorized
courts’ refusal to enforce unconscionable contracts—was novel and potentially
far-reaching.230 Indeed, Wright later acknowledged that the “opinion in
Williams v. Walker-Thomas was, shockingly, one of the first to hold that the
courts had the power to refuse to enforce such unconscionable contracts.”231
As initially drafted, the Williams decision could have cast doubt on the en-
forceability of many thousands of installment sales contracts in the District of
Columbia.232
After learning that Danaher planned to dissent and conferring with Bazelon,
Wright reframed the facts to downplay the structural inequalities at play. He
deleted the footnote about the value–price disparity.233 He also omitted the
section concerning Walker-Thomas Furniture’s knowledge of defendants’ likeli-
hood of default. The final opinion portrayed Walker-Thomas Furniture’s actions
in the two cases as unusually exploitative and the defendants as particularly
vulnerable, while understating the novelty of the legal holding. Wright circu-
228. Id. The “Loan Shark” law appeared at D.C. CODE §§ 26-601, 26-611 (1961). It did not apply to
retail credit sales. The District of Columbia’s neighboring state of Maryland did have a law regulating
such transactions that allowed the use of “add-on clauses” like the one in Williams, but required certain
disclosures and prohibited the Walker-Thomas Furniture method of accounting for payments received.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 137 (1957).
229. Draft Dissent of Judge Danaher, at 2 (July 22, 1965) (Wright Papers, Box 77, Folder 1965
September term, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
230. U.C.C. § 2-302 applied only to sales contracts. Wright’s holding that unconscionability was
part of the common law included no such limitation.
231. Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, supra note 13.
232. As of 1975, Walker-Thomas Furniture alone had 15,000 to 20,000 working accounts and
average yearly sales of $4 million. Greenberg, supra note 44, at 381. In his dissent, Judge Danaher
warned that Wright’s final published opinion posed a threat to the “thousands upon thousands of
installment credit transactions” signed each year in the District of Columbia. Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Danaher, J., dissenting).
233. Memorandum from Hon. David L. Bazelon to Hon. J. Skelly Wright (July 15, 1965) (Wright
Papers, Box 77, Folder 1965 September term, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). Bazelon
wrote: “We recently talked about your proposed opinion in this case, and particularly about my
difficulties with footnote 10 [on the value–price disparity]. You stated that you would reconsider
this footnote. Have you any further thoughts?” Id. Based on this note, it seems likely that Wright
removed the other statements speculating about Walker-Thomas Furniture’s business at Bazelon’s
suggestion.
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lated a revised opinion and Danaher’s dissent to the full court a few days later.
Bazelon concurred in the decision; three other judges (who were not on the
panel) noted minor corrections and their agreement with the disposition.234 With
a few revisions, the text went off to the printer.
The final published opinions by Wright and Danaher reflect their opposing
views about the relative competence of courts and legislatures, the limits of
freedom of contract, and the best way to regulate private economic decision
making in the postwar Consumer’s Republic. Wright found an ex post judicial
remedy within the common law of contract; Danaher suggested that either the
D.C. “Loan Shark” law or future legislation could provide those like Williams
with some degree of protection ex ante. Danaher characterized the majority as
monitoring the expenditure of welfare funds. He implicitly rejected the argu-
ment by Williams’s counsel that Walker-Thomas Furniture had no business
selling an expensive stereo to a welfare recipient.235 Danaher argued that “relief
clients” should be allowed the same expansive contractual freedom as everyone
else.236 He noted that, historically, the law had allowed people “great latitude in
making their own contracts” and cautioned against judicial interference with
this freedom.237
234. Memorandum from Hon. David L. Bazelon to Hon. J. Skelly Wright (July 23, 1965) (Wright
Papers, Box 77, Folder 1965 September term, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); Memoran-
dum from Hon. Henry Edgerton to Hon. J. Skelly Wright (July 28, 1965) (Wright Papers, Box 77,
Folder 1965 September term, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); Memorandum from
Hon. Charles Fahy to Hon. J. Skelly Wright (July 27, 1965) (Wright Papers, Box 77, Folder 1965
September term, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress); Memorandum from Hon. Carl E. McGowan
to Hon. J. Skelly Wright (July 26, 1965) (Wright Papers, Box 77, Folder 1965 September term,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
235. See Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (Danaher, J., dissenting). Danaher focused on the washing
machine purchase, rather than the stereo. The washing machine, however, would have been paid off and
safe from seizure absent the pro rata provision in the contract.
236. Id. Following Danaher’s lead, some contemporary commentators have likewise observed that
Wright’s decision is “arguably paternalistic” and “leads readers to see Williams and other members
of subordinated groups as defective.” See Spence, supra note 17, at 96; Kastely, supra note 22, at 306.
Commentators have suggested that Wright’s approach unfairly stereotypes black mothers on welfare,
like Williams, as uneducated consumers not capable of full participation in the marketplace. They rest
this argument in particular on Wright’s assertion that courts must ask: “Did each party to the contract,
considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms
of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive
sales practices?” Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Wright, however, did not make any assumptions about Williams’s education or knowledge of the
contract terms; the facts were clearly stated in the record. Indeed, Williams’s own counsel argued that
her lack of formal education was relevant to whether the contracts were unconscionable, after eliciting
testimony from Williams as to her level of education and understanding of the contract terms. Brief for
Appellants at 3, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Nos. 18604,
18605). Further, Wright’s opinion concerned not just Williams, but also William and Ruth Thorne.
Counsel for William Thorne argued that Thorne, “having a third grade level education, could not read
or write at a level which would have enabled him to understand the nature of these printed forms.” Id.
The obvious lack of education of Thorne, not Williams, may have prompted the inclusion of education
as a factor for courts to weigh.
237. Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (Danaher, J., dissenting).
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Wright had less reverence for the sanctity of private bargains and greater faith
in the competence of the judiciary to enact change. As a federal district court
judge in Louisiana, he ordered the local school board to end segregation within
New Orleans’ schools.238 A few years after deciding Williams, he explained that
courts must sometimes act outside their areas of expertise to avoid injustice. “It
would be far better indeed for these great social and political problems to be
resolved in the political arena by other branches of government,” he wrote in a
District of Columbia school desegregation case.239 When problems defy legisla-
tive resolution, however, “the judiciary must bear a hand and accept its responsi-
bility to assist in the solution.”240
In the case of credit sales to poor, inner-city residents, Wright believed that
courts and lawyers needed doctrinal tools to combat commercial abuses of the
poor within the traditional framework of contract law. Unconscionability fit the
bill. As set out in the U.C.C. and applied in Williams, unconscionability seemed
to pull commercial law towards a more subjective analysis of bargains and
equitable resolution of disputes. (Equity also reappeared in other corners of
contract law around this time, most notably in the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin’s now-famous opinion in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,241 decided the
same year as Williams.)
Yet, the doctrine had obvious limitations. Unconscionability did not suggest
that the classic model of contract formation envisioned by the common law—an
arms-length bargain between two parties of equal bargaining power—was
defective.242 Contrary to Friedrich Kessler’s suggested remedy, it did not create
new rules for adhesion contracts.243 Indeed, unconscionability existed comfort-
ably within the centuries-old framework of the common law of contracts. It
merely allowed judges to void the most egregious one-sided bargains without
throwing the entire system into chaos.244 Reformers would eventually push for
what they hoped would be a more permanent legislative solution: a separate
regulatory regime for retail installment sales contracts.
238. Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337, 342 (1956).
239. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967). Note that Wright was sitting on the
district court.
240. Id.
241. 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965) (relying on the doctrine of promissory estoppel to award
reliance damages in the absence of a formal contract). For a history of the Red Owl case, see William C.
Whitford & Stewart Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores: The Rest of the Story, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 801
(2010). For a different reading of this history, see Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the
Limits of the Legal Method, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 859 (2010).
242. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173,
1192 (1983) (observing that Wright’s decision was “deeply imbedded in the traditional approach” to
adhesion contracts).
243. See discussion supra Part II.
244. See Kennedy, supra note 102, at 1777 (“There is a strong argument that the altruist judges who
have created the modern law of unconscionability and promissory estoppel have diverted resources
available for the reform of the overall substantive structure into a dead end.”).
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IV. A LEGISLATIVE FIX
A. UNCONSCIONABILITY COMES UNDER ATTACK
The Williams litigation concluded within a year of Wright’s decision, but the
debate over unconscionability was just beginning. Williams was the subject of
several law review case notes.245 It was cited as a “famous case” in congres-
sional hearing testimony and one senator’s book about consumer issues.246 A
Michigan Law Review article called it a “cause celebre.”247 Another article
endorsed Wright’s view that Williams marked the start of something big. It cited
the decision as evidence that the judicial treatment of signed contracts as
“sacrosanct” was “slowly beginning to change.”248
More generally, scholars discussed the merits of section 2-302 in the wake
of widespread adoption of the U.C.C.249 Scholars debated whether unconscion-
ability analysis, now mandated by the Code in almost all states, provided a
useful framework for judges or businesses. The varied reactions to the doctrine
of unconscionability among legal academics reflected opposing views on the
proper role of judges and of the common law of contracts as a means of
regulating consumer transactions.
Commercial law professor Arthur Leff delivered the most devastating critique
of the Code provision on unconscionability.250 Cataloging in painstaking detail
the U.C.C. drafters’ many missteps in preparing the text and commentary of
section 2-302, Leff concluded that the provision suffered from “amorphous
unintelligibility.”251 In Leff’s view, the final draft invited judges to rely on their
own “emotional state” to determine which terms were permissible.252 By
permitting judges to “police contracts on a clause-by-clause basis,” the provi-
sion demanded they decide whether particular terms should be allowed as a
matter of policy. The term “unconscionable”—a “highly abstract word”—
provided no concrete guidelines to help resolve questions that were essentially
245. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 198; Circuit Note, Civil Law and Procedure: Contracts, Enforcement,
Unconscionability, 55 GEO. L.J. 115 (1966); Recent Case, Contracts—Enforcement—Unconscionable
Installment Sales Contract is Unenforceable—Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965), 79 HARV. L. REV. 1299 (1966).
246. Consumer Credit Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. 499 (1967) (statement of Sidney
Margolius, consumer writer); MAGNUSON & CARPER, supra note 46, at 113–14.
247. Skilton & Helstad, supra note 60, at 1477.
248. Caplovitz, supra note 71, at 651 & n.23 (citing Williams by name); see also CAPLOVITZ supra
note 72, at xvii & n.4. In the 1967 preface to his book, Caplovitz does not reference the decision by
name. However, no other decision fits his description of the case. Id.
249. Pennsylvania was the first state to enact the Code, effective in 1954. After New York objected
to some provisions, the Code was revised in 1962. It was enacted in every state except Louisiana by
1967.
250. Leff, supra note 119. Leff was an assistant professor at Washington University Law School
when this article was published. Within the year, Leff joined the faculty of Yale Law School. Ellen A.
Peters, Arthur Leff as a Scholar of Commercial and Contract Law, 91 YALE L.J. 230, 230 (1981).
251. Leff, supra note 119, at 488.
252. Id. at 516.
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“problems of social policy.”253 It invited a court to be “nondisclosive about
the basis of its decision even to itself.”254 Finding little guidance in section
2-302 as drafted, Leff offered his own framework to help courts in analyzing
unconscionability claims. Leff’s distinction—between procedural and substan-
tive unconscionability—has dominated thinking about the issue ever since.255
In the case of Williams, Leff approved the outcome, but not the method of
reaching it. He agreed that there was sufficient evidence of procedural uncon-
scionability to merit remand. The nature of the substantive unconscionability
was less apparent, however.256 Most likely, the court viewed the whole transac-
tion as substantively unfair, because Walker-Thomas Furniture knew at the time
of the sale that Williams was on relief and could not afford the stereo. Leff did
not object to the court treating welfare recipients as a special “class” for
purposes of contract law. He argued that such distinctions were “exceedingly
common in the law (not to mention life).”257 Rather, he opposed the method of
imposing these controls—regulation “via the judicial bureaucracy, on an ad hoc
case-by-case basis essentially unrestrained by legislative or administrative guid-
ance.”258 Furthermore, few such cases would make it to a judge because only
consumers with free legal representation could afford to test the legality of their
contract terms in court.259
It would be better to let legislatures, rather than judges, make such political
decisions and ban certain contract terms outright. Indeed, these contracts were
not really contracts at all, Leff argued. They were more like “products,”
things.260 These were not bargained-for exchanges in the traditional contract
law model. Nor would it be desirable to make consumers bargain for contract
253. Id. at 515.
254. Id. at 557.
255. Peters, supra note 250, at 231. Leff’s framework tracks Wright’s unconscionability analysis in
Williams. As Leff observed, Wright recognized “that unconscionability has to have two foci, the
negotiation which led to the contract and that contract’s terms.” Leff, supra note 119, at 552.
256. Leff noted that there were only two possible reasons to find the contract substantively
unconscionable: the court objected to either the entire transaction or just the pro rata provision. But, he
explained, the court would have been hard-pressed to label an add-on clause unconscionable because
similar clauses had legislative sanction in nearby states like Maryland. Leff, supra note 119, at 554–55.
Maryland did allow the use of add-on clauses like the one in Williams, but it did not permit the
Walker-Thomas Furniture method of accounting for payments received and allowed the buyer to
redeem any repossessed item in exchange for the amount owed on that item. MD. ANN. CODE art. 83,
§ 137 (1957).
257. Leff, supra note 119, at 555–56 (footnote omitted).
258. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law
Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 353 (1970).
259. See id. at 356 (noting that “you need free legal help for the consumer” to use common law
adjudication to “regulate the quality of transactions on a case-by-case basis, each one of which is
economically trivial”).
260. Id. at 352 n.18. This was also the title of another article, Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing,
19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970). In a recent article, Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren made the same
comparison. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6
(2008) (“Credit products should be thought of as products, like toasters and lawnmowers, and their sale
should meet minimum safety standards.”).
2014] 1423THE RISE AND FALL OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
terms, which would increase the cost of these transactions. Rather, Leff argued,
legislatures should face the policy questions raised by such “products” and
decide what terms were off-limits, much like they would regulate the minimum
quality of goods for sale.261 Leff feared that the availability of unconscionability
review might “stall the hard thinking and lobbying that has to be done” to deal
with such questions through statute.262 In fact, the Williams litigation had the
opposite effect.
B. CONGRESS ACTS
The Williams litigation catalyzed a process of local legislative reform to put
in place new regulations for installment sales. Shortly after the D.C. Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of Walker-Thomas Furniture, reformers
mobilized. In denying Williams relief, the Court of Appeals had faulted the
legislature; the District of Columbia had no Retail Installment Sales Act to
protect installment buyers like Williams.263 The D.C. Board of Commissioners
took note. On the Board’s instruction, the Corporation Counsel set to work
assembling a committee to “draft legislation to deal with the problem.”264 One
member of the committee described the proposed legislation as “the direct result
of the factual situation in the Williams case.”265
References to the Williams litigation recur throughout the debates about
consumer protection measures in the District of Columbia. In 1967, Professor
Egon Guttman of Howard Law School testified before Congress in favor of
installment sales regulation, on behalf of a coalition of organizations involved
in drafting the proposed legislation. The consumer coalition members agreed
that protective legislation must include an “Ora Lee Williams clause,” to limit
installment sellers’ right to repossess.266 (Guttman was quite familiar with the
Williams situation; he had assisted in drafting the amicus brief filed with the
D.C. Circuit.) Another witness at the same hearing applauded the proposed
261. Leff, supra note 258, at 352 n.18.
262. Id. at 357.
263. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. 1964). The case was
decided on March 30, 1964. Id. at 914.
264. Consumer Protection Legislation for the District of Columbia: Hearings on S. 316, S. 2589,
S. 2590, and S. 2592 Before the Subcomm. on Bus. & Commerce of the S. Comm. on the Dist. of
Columbia, 90th Cong. 29–30 (1968) (letter from Walter E. Washington, Comm’r of the District of
Columbia).
265. Kass, supra note 33. Contracts scholar Charles Knapp has theorized that unconscionability
operates as a “safety valve,” which allows judges to reach the desired result in an individual case but
also raises an alarm about “social evils” in need of redress. Knapp, supra note 30, at 609. He focuses on
decisions concerning arbitration. Id. at 626–28 (suggesting that state court decisions invalidating
mandatory arbitration clauses on unconscionability grounds serve this function, blowing off steam and
sending up an alarm). Another scholar has used the similar metaphor of a “safety net.” Amy J. Schmitz,
Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 73 (2006). The Williams
decision seems to have worked as a “safety valve.”
266. Consumer Protection Legislation for the District of Columbia: Hearings on S. 316, S. 2589,
S. 2590, and S. 2592 Before the Subcomm. on Bus. & Commerce of the S. Comm. on the Dist. of
Columbia, 90th Cong. 60 (1968) (statement of Egon Guttman, Professor of Law, Howard University).
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legislation for attacking “the Ora Lee Williams situation.”267 In its statement in
support of the bill, the D.C. Bar Association likewise referenced the facts of
Williams, arguing that the law offered protection without overreaching.268 It
would “discourage installment sellers” from offering a “combination hi-fi-TV
set costing $500.00” to “a person living on welfare,” without outright barring
“such sales to such persons.”269 Committee reports similarly noted that the
legislation would help “eliminate the type of abuse illustrated by the celebrated
case of Williams.”270 Yet, as soon as these local measures were introduced in
Congress, events conspired to shift lawmakers’ attention to the national stage.
Federal consumer credit regulation quickly took priority over local legislation
for the District of Columbia.
***
The outbreak of unrest across the country, during the “long hot summers” of
the mid-1960s, made the problems of poor, urban households nationwide
difficult for Congress to ignore.271 The same day that Williams was decided,
the California highway patrol pulled over Marquette Frye in the Los Angeles
neighborhood of Watts, setting off a chain of events that would lead to six days
of civil disorder and leave millions in property damage and thirty-four dead.272
Contemporary observers could offer no singular explanation for what sparked
and then fueled the fires that burned in America’s cities, but they agreed that the
credit practices of “ghetto” merchants were a contributing factor.273 In a subse-
quent 1968 study of the uprisings in Watts and other urban centers across the
nation, a federal investigatory commission concluded that city residents had
“[s]ignificant grievances concerning unfair commercial practices.”274 “[M]any
merchants in ghetto neighborhoods take advantage of their superior knowledge
of credit buying by engaging in various exploitative tactics,” including charging
267. Consumer Protection Legislation for the District of Columbia: Hearings on S. 316, S. 2589,
S. 2590, and S. 2592 Before the Subcomm. on Bus. & Commerce of the S. Comm. on the Dist. of
Columbia, 90th Cong. 119 (1968) (statement of Stephen M. Nassau, representing the Consumer
Protection Committee of the Greater Washington Chapter of Americans for Democratic Action).
Hearing testimony also showed that the situation was ongoing. One witness described buying goods on
credit from the “WT” company on Seventh Street and his surprise to learn from his legal aid lawyer
about the pro rata provision in his contracts. Id. at 82 (statement of James Whitaker, “WT” customer
and father of five).
268. Id. at 26 (Report of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia).
269. Id.
270. S. REP. NO. 90-1519, at 15 (1968); see also S. REP. NO. 92-500, at 7–8 (1971) (citing Williams
as a “celebrated” example of the hardships created by add-on clauses).
271. See THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE NORTH 313–55 (2008).
272. Lacey P. Hunter, Los Angeles, California, Riot 1965, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN
HISTORY 865, 865 (Leslie M. Alexander & Walter C. Rucker eds., 2010).
273. U.S. KERNER COMM’N, supra note 55, at 139–40.
274. Id. at 139.
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“exorbitant prices or credit charges.”275 Participants in the uprisings targeted
retailers’ credit records. “These were destroyed before the place was burned,”
one witness recalled.276
In April 1968, over a hundred American cities erupted in the wake of the
assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. As fires burned in the District of
Columbia on the night of April 6, the Court of General Sessions reopened for a
special nine-o’clock evening session to set bail for the arrested looters.277 The
same courthouse had set the scene, years before, for the Williams and Thorne
trials. In the streets, rioters targeted “buy now, pay later” stores. Several
buildings on the Seventh Street easy-credit corridor, just down the block from
Walker-Thomas Furniture, burned to the ground.278 Angry customers sought out
merchants’ credit records, “the books,” which recorded their debts and symbol-
ized their perceived exploitation by ghetto retailers like Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture. A woman yelled at looters in the Walker-Thomas Furniture store: “Get the
books! Get the books!”279 A man watching a clothing store burn shouted,
“[b]urn those damn records!”280 “Don’t grab the groceries,” a woman rummag-
ing through a delicatessen near Seventh and S Streets advised her son, “grab the
book.”281
Following the civil unrest in the District of Columbia and other American
cities, Congress took action on national consumer credit reform.282 Earlier
efforts to pass federal legislation had failed,283 but recent events reinvigorated
the effort to address the problem. After the 1967 wave of uprisings, Office of
Economic Opportunity head Sargent Shriver testified that problems with the
provision of consumer credit to the poor have “been a major contributor to the
275. Id. at 140. These tactics also included “high-pressure salesmanship, ‘bait advertising,’ misrepre-
sentation of prices, substitution of used goods for promised new ones, failure to notify consumers of
legal actions against them, refusal to repair or replace substandard goods . . . and use of shoddy
merchandise.” Id.
276. GERALD HORNE, FIRE THIS TIME: THE WATTS UPRISING AND THE 1960S 65 (1995) (quoting observer
John Buggs of the Los Angeles Human Relations Commission).
277. Willard Clopton, Curfew Imposed as Roving Bands Plunder and Burn, WASH. POST, Apr. 6,
1968, at A1.
278. Photograph: D.C. Riot. April ’68. Aftermath (Warren K. Leffler, Apr. 8, 1968) (on file with
Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division), available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/
ppmsca.04301.
279. William Raspberry, Lessons of the Riots, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1988, at A1.
280. Willard Clopton Jr. & Robert G. Kaiser, 11,500 Troops Confront Rioters; Three-Day Arrest
Total at 2686, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1968, at A1.
281. Ward Just, Generation Gap in the Ghetto, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1968, at B6.
282. Historian Louis Hyman argues that federal credit reform “acquired a new urgency” after the
riots. Hyman, supra note 56, at 210–11.
283. Senator Paul Douglas introduced legislation requiring credit disclosures in 1960, 1961, and
1965. Senator Proxmire introduced legislation in 1967 that led to the passage of the Truth in Lending
Act in 1968. President Johnson signed the bill into law on May 29, 1968. The Senate also held hearings
on proposed retail installment sales regulation, but the bills did not become law. Consumer Protection
Legislation for the District of Columbia: Hearings on S. 316, S. 2589, S. 2590, and S. 2592 Before the
Subcomm. on Bus. & Commerce of the S. Comm. on the Dist. of Columbia, 90th Cong. 255 (1968).
Congress eventually passed regulation in 1971.
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frustrations and the despair which finally led to the tragic upheavals which have
recently rocked Newark, Detroit and so many other cities.”284 He urged passage
of truth-in-lending legislation. In his view, the common law of contracts was out
of date, “built to meet the needs of the Industrial Revolution and adapted since
to serve the interests of the Affluent Society” and had “very little relevance to
the ghetto resident.”285
In hearings held shortly before the passage of the Truth in Lending Act,
Senator Proxmire noted that the “problem of obtaining adequate consumer
credit in the ghettos on reasonable terms is becoming one of national con-
cern.”286 This hearing followed after the February release of a federal study of
the urban riots and the March publication of a Federal Trade Commission study
of credit practices in the District of Columbia. According to Proxmire, “[r]ecent
events” in the District of Columbia showed “a deep-seated antagonism between
residents of the inner city and those merchants who serve the inner-city mar-
ket.”287 Betty Furness, Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs,
agreed that “the poor are paying more,” and the proof “was right here in the
streets 2 weeks ago.”288
A wave of consumer credit regulation followed.289 The first major piece of
the legislation, the Truth in Lending Act, provided for uniform and complete
disclosure of loan terms.290 A few years later, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
of 1974 barred discrimination against borrowers based on sex and marital
status.291 Two years after its passage, Congress amended the Act to include race,
religion, national origin, and age. It also barred discrimination against welfare
284. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Part I: Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. 242 (1967) (statement of
Sargent Shriver, Director, Office of Econ. Opportunity).
285. Id.
286. Consumer Credit and the Poor: Hearing on the Federal Trade Commission Report on Credit
Practices Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. 1
(1968) (statement of Sen. Proxmire, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking & Currency).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 26 (statement of Betty Furness, Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs).
289. The federal Truth in Lending Act passed in 1968 as Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (1970), Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974), and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (1978) followed shortly after. Congress also passed the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968 (H.U.D. Act), which included a mortgage subsidy program for low-income
borrowers, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which barred discrimination in home mortgage lending
based on race. See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012)). On the H.U.D. Act
subsidy program, see Hyman, supra note 56, at 212. The Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates the
collection and use of consumer information, but not lending practices directly. See Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681–1681t (2012)).
290. See Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1693 (2012)).
291. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691a–1691f (2012)).
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recipients.292 The National Welfare Rights Organization had fought against
welfare discrimination for several years, including demonstrations outside the
Walker-Thomas Furniture store.293 Together, these measures required lenders to
disclose loan terms and to extend credit without regard to the borrower’s race,
sex, or other protected status.
Yet, commentators generally agreed that antidiscrimination and truth-in-
lending measures would do little to help poor borrowers like Williams.294
As FTC Chairman Paul Rand Dixon advised, “truth in lending is not going to
reach the problem in the ghetto.”295 The problem was not lack of information
but lack of choice. The ghetto was not a competitive marketplace. Congress, in
Dixon’s view, needed to “figure out some way to put the ghetto back into the
stream of America.”296 Many activists and academics concurred.297 Outlawing
race-based discrimination might help middle-class minority borrowers but not
consumers like Williams. A federal commission charged with the study of
consumer credit concluded that “full access to the legal credit market by the
poor will be effectively provided only by improving their incomes,” and that the
“basic problem of the poor is that they do not have the same ability to repay
obligations as other consumers.” The solution to the problem “lies not in
glossing over the symptoms but in dealing with the major causes.”298
292. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691a–1691f (2012)).
293. Felicia Kornbluh, To Fulfill Their “Rightly Needs”: Consumerism and the National Welfare
Rights Movement, 69 RADICAL HIST. REV. 76, 90 (1997) (quoting activist who said that “[w]e do not
believe a person should be refused credit for the simple reason that he is a recipient of public
assistance”). Welfare Rights activists protested outside the Walker-Thomas Furniture store in the
District of Columbia in 1969. Welfare Units Picket Store, Urge Boycott, WASH. POST, May 30, 1969, at
B10.
294. But see Consumer Credit Protection Act, Part 2: Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. 803 (1967) (statement of Pat
Greathouse, Vice President, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America) (stating that truth-in-lending legislation would “especially help those who are most deceived
by present credit practices, the poor and the disadvantaged in the inner city ghettos and in the isolated
rural slum areas”).
295. Consumer Credit and the Poor: Hearing on the Federal Trade Commission Report on Credit
Practices Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. 10
(1968) (statement of Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman, FTC).
296. Id. at 11.
297. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, Part 1: Hearings on H.R. 11601 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong. 242 (1967)
(statement of Hon. R. Sargent Shriver, Director, Office of Econ. Opportunity) (“Disclosure alone will
not solve all the credit problems of the poor . . . [d]isclosure presupposes the ability to choose, which is
just what the poor do not have . . . .”); Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, A Proposed Uniform
Code for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 441, 449 (1967); Benny Kass, Consumer’s
View, 26 BUS. LAW. 847, 852 (1971) (“Truth in Lending does not get to the real serious problem in inner
cities which goes to the question of availability of credit . . . .”).
298. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments and Consumer Leasing Act—1975: Hearings on
S. 483, S. 1900, S. 1927, S. 1961, and H.R. 5616 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 346 (1975) (excerpts from the 1972 National
Commission on Consumer Finance Report on Consumer Credit in the United States).
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***
Congress delayed in passing installment sales legislation for the District of
Columbia until the early 1970s. To stress the need for action, reformers re-
minded lawmakers of Ora Lee Williams. One report measured the delay in
the number of years since Williams.299 Another witness also brought up
“Mrs. Williams” and lamented Congress’s failure to enact reform in the interven-
ing years.300 Finally, in 1971, Congress passed the D.C. Consumer Credit
Protection Act.
The law took aim at “overreaching and unconscionable commercial prac-
tices,” specifically outlawing pro rata provisions like the one in Ora Lee
Williams’s contract.301 Instead, lenders were required to apply payments to
retiring the oldest debts first.302 The new law also expressly gave courts the
power to refuse enforcement of “unconscionable” loans.303 Under the now-
required accounting method, Williams would have paid off everything except
for the stereo before she defaulted. The D.C. Council also later enacted an
unfair and deceptive acts and practices law, known as a “UDAP” statute, which
prohibited specified unfair trade practices and, more generally, “unconscio-
nable” contracts.304
With many lending terms set by law, the price term (both the price of the
goods sold and the interest rate) was one of the few items in a consumer credit
sale subject to bargaining and to challenge as unconscionable. But procedural
rules restricted the ability of poor consumers to assert the defense. After
Williams, the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed that a contract might be found
unconscionable based on the price term.305 Yet, courts required buyers to set out
the factual basis for the defense in their complaint, while limiting their ability to
299. Interest and Usury: Hearing on S. 1938 Before the S. Comm. on Dist. of Columbia, 92d Cong.
14 (1971) (Report and Recommendation to the City Council from the Commission on Interest Rates
and Consumer Credit).
300. Interest, Usury, and Consumer Credit: Hearings on S. 1938 and H.R. 10523 Before the
Subcomm. on Judiciary of the H. Comm. on the Dist. of Columbia, 92d Cong. 183–84 (1971) (statement
of Benny Kass, Comm’r, Commission on Uniform State Laws, District of Columbia).
301. S. REP. NO. 92-500, at 6 (1971).
302. District of Columbia Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-200, sec. 4,
§ 28-305, 85 Stat. 665, 670 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 28-3805 (2012)).
303. For the provision on unconscionability, see id. sec. 4, § 28-3812(g).
304. District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act of 1976, D.C. Law 1-76 (codified as
amended at D.C. CODE §§ 28-3901 to 28-3913 (2012)). For the provision on unconscionability, see id.
§ 28-3904(r). Like other state UDAP laws enacted around this time, the law appears to have been
modeled on the 1973 Suggested State Provisions for the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, drafted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Patricia Ryan Yohay, D.C.
Consumer Protection Procedures Act, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 642, 644 (1978). The 1984 FTC Credit
Practices Rule also offers some protection to buyers like Williams. Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate
Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 951 (2006). It bans the taking of a “nonpossessory security interest in
household goods other than a purchase money security interest.” 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2013).
305. See Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111, 113–14 (D.C. 1971).
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get necessary information from the seller through discovery.306 As a result, few
consumers prevailed in challenging contracts based on price.307 Statutory claims
were more likely to succeed.308
Thus, by the late 1970s, some poor people’s consumer contracts were par-
tially carved out of the common law of contracts and regulated according to a
more narrowly tailored set of legal standards.309 The new statute-based regime
stressed disclosure, nondiscrimination, and regulation of some small-sum loan
terms. D.C. law banned the Walker-Thomas Furniture pro rata accounting
method outright. Future D.C. borrowers faced with pro rata clauses could
defend based on statutory protections, rather than rely on the doctrine of
unconscionability. This shift, towards a statutory scheme that specified which
terms were subject to bargaining and which were banned, effectively shrank
the space in which unconscionability could operate. It rendered unconscion-
ability less important to “the law of the poor” and to modern day poor
consumers than Wright anticipated. The new legal regime that regulated poor
people’s consumer contracts more closely resembled the system that Arthur Leff
and Judge Danaher imagined, rather than what Karl Llewellyn or Judge Wright
likely envisioned.310
It also better suited the changing intellectual climate of the times. In the late
1970s and 1980s, New Right politicians and activists voiced renewed hostility
towards “activist” judging and state interference with contractual freedom.311
Unconscionability analysis, and the balancing it entailed, smacked of free-
wheeling judicial policymaking, rather than neutral or efficiency-guided judg-
306. To get discovery related to the unconscionability of the price term, a consumer first had to plead
a “sufficient factual predicate for the defense.” Id. at 114.
307. Patterson’s claim failed, as did the price unconscionability claim in Morris v. Capitol Furniture
& Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. 1971). Morris obtained discovery on the seller’s purchase price
and discovered that the goods cost the seller $234.35, yet Morris paid $832 over the course of two
years, including taxes and a “credit charge.” Id. at 776.
308. See, e.g., Blackmond v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 428 F. Supp. 344, 346 (D.D.C. 1977)
(judgment for plaintiff-buyer on Truth in Lending Act claim); Lewis v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
416 F. Supp. 514, 518 (D.D.C. 1976) (granting partial summary judgment to plaintiff-buyer on Truth in
Lending Act claims).
309. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Stewart Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past,
Present, and Future, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 805, 812; Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty
to Read—Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV.
1051, 1056 n.18 (1966).
310. This is not to suggest that Wright preferred litigation to legislation as a method for correcting
perceived abuses in the low-income marketplace. In fact, he most likely would have favored a
legislative solution over litigation. In a D.C. school desegregation case, he wrote that “[i]t would be far
better indeed for these great social and political problems to be resolved in the political arena by other
branches of government,” rather than by the judiciary. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517
(D.D.C. 1967). Leff would not have been entirely happy with the new regime either, since it still
allowed review of consumer contracts for unconscionability.
311. On the worldview of grassroots New Right activists, see LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS:
THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT (2001). On businessmen and the New Right, see KIM
PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE BUSINESSMEN’S CRUSADE AGAINST THE NEW DEAL (2009).
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ing.312 Within the legal academy, law and economics scholars also attacked the
institutional competence of courts to make distributive decisions and analyze
the fairness of contract terms. They argued that legislators were better suited
than judges to divide the wealth produced by an efficient, free-market economy.313
Critics of the doctrine labeled it paternalistic and inefficient.314
For some, Williams illustrated the most glaring problems with unconscionabil-
ity review. A sympathetic judge might easily deem an add-on clause, like the
one at issue in Williams, unconscionable when weighing the fate of a poor
borrower before the court. But, critics argued, “add-on” clauses were not in fact
harmful to the poor as a general matter; they made “good [economic] sense.”315
By allowing creditors to collect more easily from defaulting debtors, such
clauses reduced the cost of doing business with low-income customers who
might not otherwise have access to credit.316 Statutory rules would ensure that
sellers recovered no more than what was owed: principal, interest, and costs.317
312. Duncan Kennedy describes balancing, as a mode of legal reasoning, as “in retreat” in America
after 1980. Duncan Kennedy, A Transnational Genealogy of Proportionality in Private Law, in THE
FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 185, 216 (Roger Brownsword et al. eds., 2011). Another scholar
describes the shift as the “anti-emphatic turn” from “moral” to “scientific” judging. Robin West, The
Anti-Empathic Turn 8–10 (Georgetown Public Law & Legal Theory Research, Paper No. 11-97, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract1885079.
313. On the history of the law and economics movement, see STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 90–134 (2008). But note that
Arthur Leff, an early critic of unconscionability, does not fall within this camp. Leff had no doubt that
the government should intervene in the consumer marketplace. He fully endorsed the outcome in
Williams but rejected the “litigation model” of intervention at work in Williams. Instead, he asked:
“Wouldn’t it be better, finally, to face the political problems and pass a statute that deals with
cross-collateral clauses . . . ?” Leff, supra note 258, at 357.
314. See Epstein, supra note 23, at 293–95 (arguing against invalidation of contract terms based on a
finding of mere substantive, rather than also procedural, unconscionability). But note that paternalism
may be justified, from a law and economics perspective, when public welfare money is at stake. See,
e.g., Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine,
Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995). Some
law and economics scholars did not reject unconscionability outright but argued instead for a more
nuanced approach to the doctrine. Richard Craswell, for example, contended that scholars focused too
much attention on deciding when a contract ought to be invalidated, while ignoring the question of
what remedy should protect the nonconsenting party. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability
Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–7 (1993).
315. Epstein, supra note 23, at 306 n.36, 307.
316. Id. at 307.
317. Id. at 308. Although this was true when Epstein wrote in 1975, it was not the case in the District
of Columbia before 1965. Before the Code took effect in 1965, a seller under a “conditional sale” or
“lease-purchase” agreement could sue a defaulting buyer either for the amount owed or could “treat the
sale as a nullity” and recover the goods. Marvins Credit, Inc. v. Morgan, 87 A.2d 530, 531 (D.C. 1952).
The District of Columbia had not enacted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, which required creditors
to return any surplus received from the seizure and sale of the goods to the buyer. Then, in 1965, the
Code eliminated the formal distinctions between conditional sales and other forms of security interests.
Under the Code, the Walker-Thomas Furniture conditional sale would be deemed a secured transaction.
The Code required secured creditors like Walker-Thomas Furniture to account for any surplus after
seizing and selling the collateral. D.C. CODE § 28:9-504(2) (1963) (“If the security interest secures an
indebtedness, the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus . . . .”) (modern provision at
D.C. CODE § 28: 9-615(d) (2014)).
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V. THE AFTERMATH
On remand to the trial court, the Williams case did not end in a clear victory
for the store or for the borrower. It settled. After the D.C. Circuit decision came
down, Williams and Walker-Thomas Furniture returned to the trial court. The
case dragged on for a few months longer, but Walker-Thomas Furniture ulti-
mately agreed to pay Williams $200 for the goods seized from her home three
years earlier.318 Williams’s lawyer, Pierre Dostert, later remarked that Walker-
Thomas Furniture should never have permitted the case to reach the appeals
court.
But Dostert did not view the opinion as a clear victory. Instead, it created “a
degree of uncertainty” and “a dormant threat to unconscionable conduct which
could become very active with little or no notice.”319 He also predicted that
lenders would be more likely to settle at trial, rather than risk a finding of
unconscionability.320 He was right on both counts. The D.C. Neighborhood
Legal Services Project (NLSP) did make use of the decision in defending its
poor clients against repossession actions by local retailers.321 Nationwide, legal
aid attorneys and pro se consumers successfully raised unconscionability as a
defense in a series of consumer contract cases in the late 1960s and early
1970s.322 Many cases likely never made it before a judge, however. After
318. Paul Richard, Installment-Plan Law Will Shield the Needy, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1966, at B1.
319. Skilton & Helstad, supra note 60, at 1480 (quoting Letter from Pierre E. Dostert to Richard H.
Skilton (Feb. 1, 1967)).
320. Id.
321. Dostert, supra note 139, at 1186 (noting that local lawyers “began to make extensive use of
Judge Wright’s opinion in defending indigent persons at the trial level”). Dostert himself was “forced
by the pressure of private practice to discontinue legal aid work.” Id.; see also More Clients Have Been
Victims of Gross Overcharging by Some Appliance Stores, HIGHLIGHTS OF RECENT CASES (United
Planning Org./Neighborhood Legal Servs. Project, Washington, D.C.), June 2, 1965, at 3 (Microfilm
Reel 2250, Grant PA64–183, Ford Foundation Archives) (“Many examples of gross overcharging in the
sale of television sets by some local merchants continue to come to the attention of our offices. . . . In
many of these actions, NLSP is advancing the theory that these sales contracts are unconscionable as a
matter of law because of the gross discrepancy between price and value.”). The NLSP raised unconscio-
nability in another case against Walker-Thomas Furniture in 1971, but lost. Patterson v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111, 113 (D.C. 1971). Maribeth Hollaran, a consumer attorney in the law
reform unit of NSLP, represented the defendant-borrower. Gross Overpricing May Constitute Unconscio-
nability, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 534, 534 (1972) (noting that Patterson was represented by Halloran,
Neighborhood Legal Services Project); see also Oral History by Mary Wolf with Florence Wagman
Roisman, Professor of Law, Ind. Univ., in Bloomingdale, Ind. (Session 3.2, July 26, 2006) available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/women_trailblazers/roisman_interview_3.
authcheckdam.pdf (noting that Halloran was the “consumer person” in the law reform unit at NLSP).
322. Advocates started discussing and citing Williams immediately after the case was decided. The
organizer of a conference on “Consumer Credit and the Poor” at the University of Chicago wrote to the
D.C. Circuit right away to order a copy of the briefs and record abstract. In her words, the decision
“exemplified the ideas we will explore in our Conference.” Letter from Barbara J. Hillman, Conference
Planning Comm., to Clerk of the Court, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit (Sept. 10, 1965) (Case File
18604, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Record Group 276, Records of U.S. Courts of
Appeals, National Archives and Records Administration).
In 1964, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire also provided a useful precedent for the legal aid
attorneys in American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, in which the court found unconscionable a
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Williams and the unconscionability cases that followed in its wake, lenders
likely wised up to the dangers of going to court to enforce potentially unconscio-
nable contracts. Given that few consumers had the resources or legal acumen to
raise unconscionability as a defense, creditors like Walker-Thomas Furniture
perhaps realized that they would be better off dropping their claims against the
few “squeaky wheels” like Williams who put up a fuss.323
In response to the new D.C. installment sales legislation, Walker-Thomas
Furniture seems to have changed its contracts to comply with the law. By 1977,
the furniture company had deleted the pro rata clause from its form contract,
instead applying payments to the oldest purchase first.324 Walker-Thomas Fur-
niture did not fundamentally alter its business practices, however.325 In the
mid-1970s, the company continued to solicit business and collect payments
through door-to-door salesmen and to sell used and repossessed merchandise as
“new.”326 In many cases, customers did not learn the cost of the merchandise
they had purchased until after it was delivered. Collection agents would time
contract that required the customers to “pay[] $1,609 for goods and services valued at far less.”
201 A.2d 886, 889 (N.H. 1964).
After Williams, courts found contracts for the sale of goods to be unconscionable in several cases.
See, e.g., Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640 (N.J. 1971) (seller targeted low-income buyers and those on
welfare); Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (Union County Ct., N.J. 1970) (buyers received welfare
during period of installment contract); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1969) (same); Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (Attorney General suit on
behalf of buyers statewide); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1966)
(Spanish-speaking buyer with one week left on his job at time of sale), rev’d on issue of damages and
aff’d, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967).
A few cases involved contracts for consumer services, rather than goods. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Bel
Fior Hotel, 408 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (Attorney General suit on behalf of community
college student tenants); Albert Merrill Sch. v. Godoy, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974) (pro se
student with high school education and limited English proficiency challenging trade school contract);
Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) (pro se tenant challenging
lease terms); Educ. Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
The defense was raised without success in two D.C. cases: Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. 1971), and Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. 1969).
The author identified the above cases through a review of all decisions included in the “WESTLAW
ALLCASES” database that cited Williams and were decided before 1980.
323. On the “squeaky wheel” problem, see Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the
Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 279 (2012).
324. The new Walker-Thomas Furniture provision provided:
Whenever subsequent purchases have been added and consolidated in a new balance, the
payment provided herein on the new balance shall be considered allocated to the first
purchase, and, in order, to each subsequent purchase. Each purchase will be considered a
single unit for the purposes of each allocation, thereby each purchase unit will be completely
paid for in order of seniority, the seller retaining title only to those purchases not completely
paid for on this allocation. The amount of any down payment on a subsequent purchase shall
be allocated in its entirety to such subsequent purchase. In the case of items purchased on the
same date, the lowest priced shall be deemed first paid for.
Blackmond v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 428 F. Supp. 344, 345 (D.D.C. 1977).
325. For a longer discussion of the effects of the decision on Walker-Thomas Furniture, see Colby,
supra note 23, at 646–60.
326. Greenberg, supra note 44, at 381.
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their visits to coincide with the arrival of customers’ welfare or social security
checks.327 Salespersons cleverly provided check-cashing services for their cus-
tomers, thereby allowing the company to deduct the monthly installment pay-
ment before handing over the remaining cash to the customer.328
If a customer failed to pay, the store would send threatening letters, make
early morning and late evening collection calls, contact the borrower’s rela-
tives and friends, and—if necessary—repossess the merchandise. Often, Walker-
Thomas Furniture would repossess goods by removing them from the custom-
er’s home when no adults were present or would intimidate the customer into
turning over the goods without a court order.329 When necessary, the company
would sue to recover the balance owed, seeking either judicially sanctioned
repossession or an order for a money judgment.330
The store gained additional leverage over some customers from the rules
governing provision of welfare benefits. By the mid-1970s, most Walker-
Thomas Furniture clients were still “working poor” and many received govern-
ment assistance.331 To dissuade such customers from complaining to outside
authorities, a salesperson might threaten to withhold credit in the future, or to
notify state authorities about unreported income.332 Walker-Thomas Furniture
employed six men, known as “pimps,” who investigated customers to obtain
information that might be used to intimidate them into not complaining.333 For
women on welfare, this might include the whereabouts of an estranged spouse
whose income would disqualify the family from receiving relief.334 The Federal
Trade Commission investigated Walker-Thomas Furniture in 1975; the com-
pany later entered into a consent decree to halt its unfair, false, misleading, and
deceptive trade practices.335
The Walker-Thomas Furniture storefront on Seventh Street was eventually
shuttered,336 but similar companies remain in business today.337 The rent-to-
327. See id. at 382.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 385–86.
330. Citing an interview with one of Walker-Thomas Furniture’s lawyers, Colby states that Walker-
Thomas Furniture changed its strategy after Williams and started suing customers for the balance due
under their contracts, rather than seeking seizure orders (writs of replevin). Colby, supra note 23, at
657. However, repossession did not die out completely. In 1968 the company sued to repossess another
customer’s goods. Roebuck v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 310 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1973).
331. Greenberg, supra note 44, at 381.
332. Id. at 389–90.
333. Id. at 390.
334. Id. at 390–91.
335. In re Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 87 F.T.C. 26 (1976). Colby likewise concludes that un-
conscionability “did not appear to substantially advance justice and fair play for the customers” of
Walker-Thomas Furniture. Colby, supra note 23, at 657. The company complied with the letter of
consumer protection laws, “but clearly made little effort to make its contracts fundamentally more fair.”
Id. at 658.
336. Walker-Thomas Furniture remained in business through the late 1980s. Morris Levin Business-
man Mo, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2007, at B5 (noting that Levin, a Walker-Thomas Furniture executive,
retired from the firm in 1987).
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own industry, which includes national chains like Rent-A-Center, serves a
similar clientele.338 Rent-to-own stores “lease” furniture and other consumer
goods to their customers on a weekly or monthly payment schedule, with an
option for the customer to buy the goods at the end of the lease term. The
majority of contracts end in a sale.339 Like Walker-Thomas Furniture in the
1960s, the modern rent-to-own industry is regulated by state law, with no
federal oversight.340 Most states, including the District of Columbia, treat
rent-to-own transactions as leases, rather than credit sales.341 The industry
operates beyond the bounds of the installment sales regulations Congress passed
in the wake of Williams to police lending to the poor in the District of
Columbia.
Indeed, the idea of the “law of the poor” was already in retreat by the late
1970s, after the Supreme Court issued a string of rulings refusing to incorporate
the concept into constitutional law. In a series of cases in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, poverty lawyers urged the Court to review the “law of the poor”
more closely, by applying heightened scrutiny to legal distinctions based on
wealth. The Court rejected the invitation.342 The poor did not constitute a
distinct and protected class for equal protection purposes, the Court decided.343
The Justices did modernize the “law of the poor,” sweeping away many
337. Note that the Walker-Thomas Furniture contracts were structured in the same way as modern
rent-to-own agreements, as leases rather than sales of goods. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 116,
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3389). In Williams’s
contracts, the words “Lease No. ____” appeared in the upper left-hand corner of the Walker-Thomas
Furniture form agreement, in small type. Id. Buried within the body of the form, the contract also
specified that Williams “hired” (rather than “bought”) the property listed on the form. Id. Walker-
Thomas Furniture retained legal title to the goods specified in the contract until the customer tendered
receipts showing payment of the full amount owed. Id.
338. JAMES M. LACKO ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, SURVEY OF RENT-TO-OWN CUSTOMERS 32–33 (2000)
(finding 59% of rent-to-own customers had household incomes under $25,000).
339. Id. at ES-1.
340. Id. at 3.
341. See, e.g., Lease-Purchase Agreement Amendment Act of 2002, 49 D.C. Reg. 1000 (Apr. 13,
2002) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 42-3671.01 to .14 (2012)). Only a handful of states deem
rent-to-own transactions to be credit sales, to which installment sales regulations apply. See, e.g.,
Perez v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 892 A.2d 1255, 1268 (N.J. 2006) (finding “entire transaction was
structured with ownership as its goal”). In Wisconsin, Rent-A-Center has tried, so far without success,
to modify the form of its transactions to avoid being subject to the state’s Consumer Act. See Burney v.
Thorn Ams., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 762, 764 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Hall, 510 N.W.2d
789, 790–91 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
342. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (holding Texas school
financing system did not violate Equal Protection Clause); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)
(holding state eviction law concerning nonpayment of rent did not violate Equal Protection Clause);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (holding Maryland Aid to Families with Dependent
Children formula imposing upper limit on welfare benefits did not violate Equal Protection Clause).
343. Anti-poverty research reinforced this conclusion. Researchers increasingly fixated on the
individual behavior and characteristics of poor people, rather than the role of private, nonstate actors in
constructing and maintaining barriers to economic mobility for the poor as a class. See ALICE
O’CONNOR, POVERTY KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE POOR IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
U.S. HISTORY 291–92 (2001).
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vestiges of the old “poor law,” without imposing a heightened standard of
review for laws directed at “the poor” as a class. Vagrancy laws criminalizing
begging and loitering were struck down as “archaic” holdovers from the
Elizabethan era.344 Residency requirements to obtain welfare benefits, and
limits on the migration of poor people across state lines—other remnants of the
old “poor law” system—were also declared unconstitutional.345 To reach these
results, the Court relied on generally applicable constitutional rights, such as the
right “to travel” and to “due process,” rather than by recognizing poverty as a
suspect classification.346 “The poor,” as a category of analysis, found little
traction in the Court in the 1970s and beyond. The study of poverty law also fell
out of fashion in the legal academy by the late 1970s.347
Unconscionability did not flourish, but it survived.348 However, by the early
twenty-first century, the doctrine had become conceptually unmoored from
Wright’s idea of the “law of the poor.” Modern proponents of the doctrine of
unconscionability rarely invoked the “law of the poor” in its defense.349 Instead,
344. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). The Court nearly decided the
question in a District of Columbia case, but then dismissed the appeal. See Hicks v. District of
Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 252 (1966) (dismissing writ of certiorari). On the drafting of Papachristou
and the history of vagrancy laws, see Risa L. Goluboff, Essay, Dispatch from the Supreme Court
Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What the Links Between Them Reveal About the History of
Fundamental Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1372–73 (2010).
345. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174–75
(1941).
346. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1970) (procedural due process); Shapiro, 394
U.S. at 629–30 (right to interstate travel). Early drafts of Papachristou also used fundamental “rights”
reasoning. Justice Douglas described “walking, strolling, loafing, wandering, [and] nightwalking” as
rights protected by the Ninth Amendment. See Goluboff, supra note 344, at 1364. In the end, the Court
scraped this argument and declared the law at issue void for vagueness. Id. at 1366–67.
347. Some law schools continued to offer courses on “poverty law,” but interest in the subject
declined among both students and faculty after the early 1970s. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Musical Chairs
and Tall Buildings: Teaching Poverty Law in the 21st Century, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1363, 1363–64
(2007). But see Martha F. Davis, The Pendulum Swings Back: Poverty Law in the Old and New
Curriculum, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1391, 1405–15 (2007) (suggesting that “human rights” law courses
may serve a similar function in the law school curriculum); Howard S. Erlanger & Gabrielle Lessard,
Mobilizing Law Schools in Response to Poverty: A Report on Experiments in Progress, 43 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 199, 199 (1993) (noting that interest in poverty law, “a prominent subject of legal study in the
1960s and early 1970s, faded during the late 1970s and 1980s” but rose again in the 1990s).
348. See, e.g., Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 920 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002)
(finding contract unconscionable, but observing that unconscionability review, “which began in earnest
in the mid-1960s, slowed soon thereafter” and that decisions from that period “generally involved
contracts where, due to unsophistication or lack of education, the consumer entered into a grossly unfair
agreement”). In the twenty-first century, unconscionability is most often invoked to challenge manda-
tory arbitration provisions. See discussion and authorities cited supra note 16.
349. A poverty law textbook, entitled Law of the Poor, came out in 1973, after Wright’s letter to the
American Law Reports about Williams. ARTHUR B. LAFRANCE ET AL., LAW OF THE POOR (1973). The text
covers low-income consumer law, housing and poverty, welfare, and “federal judicial remedies for the
poor.” Id. at 381. Other casebooks used the terms “poverty law” or “law and poverty.” See, e.g., GEORGE
COOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND POVERTY (2d. ed. 1973). The term “poverty law”
remained in use. See, e.g., JULIE A. NICE & LOUISE G. TRUBEK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON POVERTY LAW
(1997); Wax, supra note 347, at 1363. But references to the “law of the poor” do not appear in journal
articles after the mid-1970s, except for citations to the LaFrance textbook and tenBroek’s 1966
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cutting-edge arguments in favor of unconscionability review rested on insights
gathered from behavioral psychology. Consumers (regardless of wealth) were
cognitively prone to make irrational decisions sometimes, scholars argued. To
correct for such defects in reasoning, the state could justifiably intervene in their
bargains.350 Scholarly treatment of unconscionability, and of the Williams deci-
sion, thus reflected the shifting trends in legal thought at the end of the twentieth
century away from conceptions of law rooted in “context, social circumstance,
institutions, and history.”351 “The law of the poor,” a concept “thick” with social
circumstance and history, had no place in this logic.352
CONCLUSION
By the end of the century, the “law of the poor” no longer appeared to
be a “growing area of the law,” as Judge Wright had forecast in 1967.353
Yet, Wright’s prediction about the trajectory of the “law of the poor” did not
entirely miss the mark. He was right that Williams would prove “very helpful”
to anti-poverty advocates.354 The litigation raised public consciousness of prob-
lems in the low-income marketplace and alerted concerned citizens and D.C.
lawmakers to a recurring problem in need of a legislative fix. It catalyzed a
process of legislative reform that culminated in the passage of a retail install-
ment sales act for the District of Columbia.355
This Article emphasizes the importance of this interplay between courts and
legislatures in creating a regulatory regime for consumer lending to low-income
households in Washington, D.C. in the 1960s and 1970s. It also highlights the
role of common law litigation in the process of legal change. As other scholars
have observed, deciding how best to regulate boilerplate language in consumer
contracts involves a choice among three possible institutions. The market, the
California Law Review symposium by the same name. See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Discretion in Social
Welfare: The Uneasy Position in the Rule of Law, 92 YALE L.J. 1270, 1272–73 (1983).
350. See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 20, at 738–40 (proposing framework for “credibility
analysis” of Williams context); Korobkin, supra note 17, at 458–67 (applying behavioral law and
economics insights to analyze whether the Williams contract should be enforced); Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203,
1278–90 (2003) (proposing courts liberally refuse to enforce terms found unconscionable under a
modified version of the doctrine that incorporates behavioral law and economics insights). But see
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 205, 208 (2000). Shiffrin offers a different defense of unconscionability than the behavioral
law and economics scholars. Id. She argues that states may refuse to enforce unconscionable agree-
ments to avoid abetting socially harmful conduct. Id.
351. DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 3 (2011) (“[C]onceptions of human nature that in the
post-World War II era had been thick with context, social circumstance, institutions, and history gave
way to conceptions of human nature that stressed choice, agency, performance, and desire. Strong
metaphors of society were supplanted by weaker ones. Imagined collectivities shrank; notions of
structure and power thinned out.”).
352. See id.
353. Letter from Hon. J. Skelly Wright to William E. Shipley, supra note 1; see supra Part V.
354. Letter from Hon. J. Skelly Wright to William E. Shipley, supra note 1.
355. See supra section IV.B.
2014] 1437THE RISE AND FALL OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
courts, or the legislature can supply the enforceable terms of standard form
contracts.356 Considered in the snapshot of the present, these institutions appear
to be alternative options, each governed by their own decision-making rules.357
But when viewed over a longer expanse of time, the interplay between them be-
comes apparent.
As contracts scholars have theorized, contract-based disagreements that are
“frequently litigated” and involve a “specific type-situation” do not remain
subject to the basic rules of the judge-administered common law for more than
a generation or two.358 When such “problems reach the threshold of public or
general business concern, they are solved or at least coped with by other
means—by legislation, for example.”359 They are carved out of the common
law, through statutes “removing a whole area from the domain of contract
law.”360
This Article offers a case study of this process in action and suggests the
importance of litigation in elevating a recurring contractual problem to the
threshold of public concern. It explains how the legislative revival of unconscio-
nability in the Uniform Commercial Code laid the groundwork for new com-
mon law arguments to be raised in the D.C. courts in the Williams case. In turn,
the Williams litigation brought together a coalition of reformers, who pressured
Congress to adopt a new set of rules for policing installment sales. Repeatedly
citing the facts of Williams as evidence of the need for a statutory fix, reformers
eventually achieved their goal. In 1971, Congress passed the District of Colum-
bia Consumer Credit Protection Act, which banned the Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture pro rata accounting method outright. Accordingly, within a decade after
Williams, retail installment sales contracts in the District of Columbia were
partially carved out of the common law of contracts. They were instead regu-
lated according to a more narrowly tailored set of statutory standards. Thus, in
the end, the Williams litigation did play a role in creating a “law of the poor”
consumer. It was just not the part that Judge Wright likely envisioned.
356. See, e.g., Whitford, supra note 25, at 194.
357. For a discussion of institutional choice and unconscionability that does not employ a historical
perspective, see Neil Komesar, The Logic of the Law and the Essence of Economics: Reflections on
Forty Years in the Wilderness, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 265, 282–85.
358. Friedman & Macaulay, supra note 309, at 812.
359. Id.
360. Macaulay, supra note 309, at 1056 n.18.
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APPENDIX A: TEXT OF THE WILLIAMS CONTRACT361
Lease No. _______ READ CONTRACT BEFORE SIGNING
This Deed Witnesseth that upon and subject to the terms and conditions
hereinafter stated, I _________ have this day hired of and from THE WALKER-
THOMAS FURNITURE COMPANY, (a partnership) having an office at Nos.
1027–1031 Seventh Street, Northwest, in the City of Washington, District of
Columbia, certain property of the description and value as follows, viz:
__________________________
__________________________
__________________________
__________________________
__________________________
Total value ______ Dollars. The terms and conditions aforesaid which I hereby
agree to perform and abide by are as follows, viz: Said hiring is only for my
own personal use of said property at my home No. ________ Street _______ in
said City of Washington, where, at my said home, said property may be seen at
all times by the agents of said Company, and I shall not without the consent
of said Company in writing and subject to the conditions of such consent, cause
or permit any of said property to be removed therefrom or placed in storage, nor
shall I without such consent in writing transfer any of my rights hereunder;
nor shall I mortgage, rent, pawn, dispose of or sell said property or any part
thereof; nor shall I do anything whereby the rights of said Company hereunder
or its title to, or my actual possession of, said property or any part thereof, shall
or might be in anywise endangered, impaired or lost. For such use I shall pay to
said Company now the sum of ___________ dollars cash, and hereafter I shall
pay, without any demand therefor, to said Company at its store, or at such other
place or places in said City as said Company shall hereafter in writing direct
_______ dollars on the ____ day of each ____ until all said payments actually
and promptly made shall in the aggregate equal the total value aforesaid; and
thereupon the said Company, upon the surrender to said Company of the
receipts given for all such payments, shall transfer to me at my own expense by
bill of sale the title to said property, but until such transfer such title shall
remain in said Company, and I shall not have or claim the same, provided, that
before such transfer of title, in case of default by me hereunder, I shall also fully
reimburse said Company for all its expenses reasonably incurred in any efforts
it may make to recover and maintain possession of said property hereun-
der. For every such payment the Company shall give me a written receipt,
which shall be my only evidence of such payment, and I shall never claim any
benefit of any payment of which such evidence shall have been lost or de-
stroyed. Upon my failure to make any of said payments at the time or place
361. Transcribed from Transcript of Record at 122, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (No. 3389).
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aforesaid, although there shall have been no legal or formal demand therefor, or
in case of failure on my part to take such care of any of said property as is
required of a bailee for hire, or my failure to perform or abide by any of the
terms and conditions of this agreement the said Company, by its agents, or the
United States Marshal in and for the District of Columbia, or his deputies at the
instance of said Company, may enter my said home or any place where any of
said property may be found or where said Company may have reasonable cause
to believe the same to be, and take actual possession of such property and
remove the same therefrom either with or without legal process, and without
previous demand therefor, and in such case I hereby waive and relinquish to,
and forever discharge the said Company of and from all payments previously
made hereunder, and I hereby release and discharge the said Company and its
agents and the said United States Marshal and his deputies of and from any and
all damages caused by such entry or by such taking or removal and of and from
all claims which I may ever have by reason of any such payments, entry, taking,
or removal. If I am now indebted to the Company on any prior leases, bills or
accounts, it is agreed that the amount of each periodical installment payment to
be made by me to the Company under this present lease shall be inclusive of
and not in addition to the amount of each installment payment to be made by me
under such prior leases, bills or accounts; and all payments now and hereafter
made by me shall be credited pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills and
accounts due the Company by me at the time each such payment is made. No
indulgence to me by said Company as to time, amount, or place of payment or
otherwise hereunder shall be construed to be a waiver by said Company of any
of its rights or any of my duties hereunder, and no clause or stipulation of this
agreement shall be deemed rescinded as against said Company unless such
rescission is in writing and signed by the said Company. The word “Com-
pany” wherever it appears in this deed includes and shall be construed to mean
The Walker Thomas Furniture Company aforesaid and its successors and as-
signs and each of them. This agreement is made subject to the approval of
said Company, such approval to be evidenced only by the delivery to me of said
property, and at any time before such delivery the said Company may, if it so
elect, refuse to deliver said property to me, which refusal shall operate as a
cancellation of this deed, and any rights which I may have or might have had
hereunder shall immediately cease and determine. I also agree to pay attorney’s
fees of no less than $10 resulting from my breach of this lease in case a
judgment for the deficiency in balance is awarded against me or possession of
articles listed above is awarded to said Company. And hereunto I bind myself,
my heirs, executors, administrators and assigns forever.
WITNESS my hand and seal this ___ day of ___ 19 __ _________________
Husband
_________________
Wife
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Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of:
___________________________ ____________________________
Guarantor
NO DEPOSITS REFUNDED FREE STORAGE FOR CUSTOMERS NO GOODS EXCHANGED
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